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ABSTRACT
The Macroeconomics of Establishment-Level Employment Dynamics
by
Joshua K. Montes
Chair: Matthew D. Shapiro
This dissertation comprises four chapters examining the macroeconomics of establishment-
level employment dynamics. “Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: Evidence
from Administrative Data,” examines the relationship between wage rigidity and
employment outcomes using employer-employee data. The estimates suggest wage
rigidity prevents 24.5 percent of wage cuts that would have occurred in absence of
wage rigidity. An establishment with the average level of wage rigidity is predicted
to have a 0.7 percentage point increase in the layoff rate, a 1.8 and 1.3 percentage
point reduction in the quit and hire rates.
“Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: Theory” derives the analytics of a
structural model, showing that wage rigidity works through two channels. First, a
cost to cutting wages deters establishments from reducing the current wages, increas-
ing layoffs and reducing hires to lower the wage bill in the face of an adverse shock.
Second, forward-looking establishments reduce the cost of wage cuts in future peri-
ods through dampening wage increases in the current period. Counterfactual policy
simulations suggest that inflation can “grease the wheels” of the labor market by
facilitating real wage cuts when nominal wage cuts are costly to achieve.
ix
“Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: The Role of Establishment Size and
Age” shows that, on average, large establishments have more wage rigidity than
small establishments and old establishments have more wage rigidity than young
establishments. Estimates show, however, that wage rigidity and employment has a
stronger relationship in younger establishments compared to older establishments.
“Bank Balance Sheet Shocks and the Effects of the Financial Crisis” uses employer-
employee data from Germany to examine the impact of exogenous shocks to bank
capital. German regional banks’ trading losses from U.S. mortgage-backed securities
cause a deep economic contraction in the banks exclusive geographic domain. An-
nual loan and output growth decline by 20 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively,
and the annual unemployment rate rises by 1.4 percentage points in affected states
compared to unaffected states, on average. The effect is stronger for privately-held
than for publicly-listed firms. Private firms in affected states reduce net hiring by 24
percentage points and cut investment by one-half, relative to publicly-listed firms.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
A perennial debate in economics concerns the extent to which difficulties in reduc-
ing nominal wages affect employment outcomes. While there exists a large literature
documenting the existence of wage rigidity in several modern, industrial economies,
quantifying an empirical relationship between wage rigidity and employment out-
comes has proven difficult. Further, no research to date has been able to quantify the
cost to an establishment for reducing a worker’s wage in the presence of wage rigidity.
A more recent debate, with the onset of the Great Recession, concerns the extent
to which shocks to the supply of bank credit affect worker-level employment out-
comes in firms exposed to those banking shocks. As the literature is realtively young,
there exists little empirical evidence quantifying the relationship between bank shocks
and establishment-level and firm-level employment, and, due to data limitations, no
empirical evidence of the impact on worker outcomes. Both debates are of central
importance to macroeconomics and the formation of macroeconomic policy, yet the
extent and signfinicance of both topics are subjects of considerable uncertainty.
The research of this dissertation uses individual-level, employer-employee linked,
administrative data to quantify the relationship between microeconomic employment
adjustment and variables of key interest to macroeconomic policy: wage rigidity and
financing constraints. A significant advantage of this research over previous work is
1
that it uses high quality, adminstrative, individual worker data with establishment
identifiers and a rich set of covariates from a modern industrial economy to quan-
tify these relationships at the level where the employment decisions are made: the
establishment. The main findings in the research on wage rigidity and employment
outcomes are that there is a significant, empirical relationship between wage rigidity
and layoffs, quits, and hires and that only moderate costs to cutting nominal wages
are necessary to generate these movements in employment. The main findings in the
research on banking shocks and employment outcomes are that, in response to a local
banking shock, establishments reduce their levels of employment and that privately
held establishments reduce their levels of employment by even more than establish-
ments that are part of a publicly traded company. Below, I discuss the results from
each chapter in more detail.
Chapter 2, “Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: Evidence from Adminis-
trative Data” examines the empirical relationship between downward nominal wage
rigidity and employment outcomes using linked employer-employee data and has four
novel contributions. First, this chapter develops a theoretical model of an establish-
ment’s decision making problem in the presence of downard nominal wage rigidity,
modeling wage rigidity through a downward nominal wage adjustment cost function
with a fixed menu cost, a linear adjustment cost, and a quadratic adjustment cost.
The model generates three directly testable predictions: establishment’s with greater
measured wage rigidity should exhibit a higher layoff rate and lower quit and hire
rates.
Second, this chapter introduces a unique approach to measuring wage rigidity at
the establishment level using worker-level year-over-year nominal wage changes and
provides evidence from monte carlo simulations that the proposed measure is unbi-
ased in the small worker sample sizes often found in the establishments of the sample.
Using the proposed measure of wage rigidity, this chapter provides evidence on the de-
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gree of wage rigidity and the dispersion of wage rigidity present in the establishments
in the sample. Establishment-level estimates suggest that wage rigidity prevents 24
percent of counterfactual wage cuts with an estimated standard deviation of 27 per-
cent across all establishments, indicating significant variation in wage rigidity across
establishments.
Third, chapter 2 estimates the empirical relationship between wage rigidity and
layoffs, quits, and hires at the establishment-level and confirms the predictions of the
theoretical model. An establishment with the sample average level of measured wage
rigidity is predicted to have a 0.7 percentage point increase in the layoff rate, a 1.8
percentage point reduction in the quit rate, and a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the
hire rate relative to an establishment with no measured wage rigidity. Wage rigidity
interacts with movements in establishment revenue in economically meaningful ways,
amplifying its relationship with employment outcomes. An establishment with the
sample average level of measured wage rigidity is predicted to have a 1.5 percentage
point increase in the layoff rate, a 3.5 percentage point decrease in the quit rate, and a
2.6 percentage point decrease in the hire rate in response to a one standard deviation
movement in revenue growth.
Finally, this chapter uses the empirical results to estimate the structural param-
eters in the downward nominal wage adjustment cost function. Estimation of the
parameters in the wage cutting cost function implies that wage rigidity reduces prof-
its by approximately 3.3 percent at the average establishment, with the average es-
tablishment facing a per-worker menu cost of 774 euros annually of cutting nominal
wages. These estimates are the first in the literature to quantify the costs an estab-
lishment faces to cut its workers’ nominal wages and suggests that even moderate
costs of cutting nominal wages generate meaningful effects on employment outcomes.
Chapter 3, “Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: Theory”, provides two
contributions. First, it derives the simple analytics of the establishment decision
3
making model to establish the intuition of how wage rigidity effects establishment
choices. Second, it uses the estimated model to provide a series of counterfactual
inflation policy simulations to determine whether inflation “greases the wheels” of
the labor market.
The analytics of the theoretical model shows that wage rigidity works through
two channels in the model. The first channel is immediately clear: a cost to cutting
wages deters establishments from reducing the current wage of its workers, leading
the establishment to pursue employment adjustment through increased layoffs and
reduced hiring to lower the wage bill in the face of an adverse shock. Further, not
reducing the wage in response to a negative shock leads to a lower quit rate at the
establishment, further exacerbating the need for layoffs and reduced hiring to adjust
employment. The second channel through which wage rigidity works in the model is
that establishments are forward-looking and will reduce the cost of wage rigidity in
future periods through dampening wage increases in response to positive shocks in
the current period.
The series of counterfactual policy simulations provide establishment and worker
outcomes under three inflation regimes: a low level of 0 percent inflation, a moderate
level of 1.3 percent inflation (the average inflation rate over the sample period), and
a high level of 5 percent inflation. Increasing the inflation rate in the model from 1.3
percent to the counterfactual 5 percent mitigates the effects of downward nominal
wage rigidity, as the average establishment’s profit loss falls from 3.3 percent in the
baseline case to 1.7 percent in the case of 5 percent inflation. Further, the layoff rate
attributed to wage rigidity falls from 1.1 percent in the baseline case to 0.7 percent
in the 5 percent inflation case, and the quit and hire rates increase from 12.2 percent
to 12.7 percent and 9.5 percent to 9.7 percent, respectively. Thus, the counterfactual
simulations provide some evidence that inflation may “grease the wheels’ of the labor
market.
4
Chapter 4, “Wage Rigidity and Employment: The Role of Establishment Size and
Age”, examines whether the relationship between establishment-level wage rigidity
and layoffs, quits, and hires varies meaningfully across large and small establishments
and young and old estbalishments. The results show that large establishments, on
average, exhibit slightly more wage rigidity than smaller establishments and that
older establishments exhibit significantly more wage rigidity, on average, than the
younger establishments.
Interestingly, while the younger establishments exhibit lower estimated wage rigid-
ity than the older establishments, the younger establishments display a much stronger
relationship between wage rigidity and layoffs and hires. The average young establish-
ment exhibits an increase in its layoff rate by 4.7 percentage points and a redcution
in its hire rate by 7.1 percentage points relative to a young establishment with no
wage rigidity, whereas the average old establishment see no significant increase in its
layoff rate and only a 3.4 percentage point reduction in its hire rate. The young and
old establishmets experience relatively similar experiences in quits, with 1.6 and 1.7
percentage point reductions, respectively.
A significant difference also exists between large and small establishments. Wage
rigidity increases layoffs at the average large establishment by 1 percentage point
and decreases quits and hires by 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively, whereas
wage rigidity and layoffs have no statisitcal relationship in small establishments and
decreases quits and hires by 1.2 and 2.5 percentage points respectively.
Chapter 5, “Bank Balance Sheet Shocks and the Effects of the Financial Crisis”,
studies the impact of an exogenous shock to the supply of bank loan credit on em-
ployment using a unique, comprehensive, employer-employee dataset from German
social security records. The geographically contained nature of the German bank-
ing system makes this dataset particularly well suited to study the worker impact of
an exogenous contraction in the local supply of bank credit. German savings banks
5
are required, by law, to only loan to and take deposits from customers within each
bank’s geographically specified region, and local bank customers–both businesses and
private households–face significant costs to switching banks. Further, the German
regional savings banks’ trading losses from U.S. mortgage-backed securities provide
the opportunity to study the impact of an internationally imported shock to bank
capital completely unrelated to local demand.
The German savings banks’ trading losses from U.S. mortgage-backed securities
cause a deep economic contraction in the banks exclusive geographic domain. Using
detailed, annual balance sheet data for the universe of German banks, this chapter
shows that loan growth declines by 20 percentage points, on average over the four cri-
sis years, in regions with exposed banks. The reduction in loan credit translates into
meaningful macroeconomic outcomes, with regional output declining by 0.3 percent-
age points and the unemployment rate rising by 1.4 percentage points, on average, in
affected regions compared to unaffected regions during each of the four crisis years.
Chapter 5 then explores a possible mechanism through which bank shocks transmit
through the economy by examining whether establishment’s belonging to privately-
held firms that are more dependent on local bank loans to finance their business ac-
tivities are differentially and adversely affected compared to establishments belonging
to publicly-listed and traded firms that can access international and domestic equity
markets for financing needs. The results show that the effect is stronger for privately-
held firms than for publicly-listed firms. Establishments in privately-held firms in
affected states reduce net hiring by 24 percentage points relative to establishments in
publicly-listed firms.
6
CHAPTER II
Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes:
Evidence from Administrative Data
You say, “We know from repeated experience that the money price of
labour never falls till many workmen have been for some time out of
work.” I know no such thing; and, if wages were previously high, I can
see no reason whatever why they should not fall before many labourers
are thrown out of work. All general reasoning, I apprehend, is in favour
of my view of this question, for why should some agree to go without any
wages while others were most liberally rewarded?
Letter of David Ricardo to Thomas Malthus, 1821
2.1 Introduction1
A perennial debate in economics concerns the extent to which difficulty reducing
nominal wages affects employment outcomes. This paper uses a novel dataset to esti-
mate the extent of wage rigidity at a sample of West German establishments. It then
examines the relationship between establishment-level wage rigidity and employment
outcomes, specifically layoff, quit, and hire rates. The results are consistent with
1This chapter is joint work the Gabriel Ehrlich (Congressional Budget Office).
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the predictions of a theoretical model of establishment decision-making in the face of
downward nominal wage rigidity (simply “wage rigidity” hereafter). Establishments
with more rigid wages exhibit higher layoff rates and lower quit and hire rates.
The paper introduces a measure of wage rigidity suitable for establishment-level
analysis. The data are particularly useful for this task, as they contain total compen-
sation histories for every worker at each of the sampled establishments. Furthermore,
the compensation histories are taken from administrative data and should be free
of measurement error, though have their own set of measurement issues. There are
three major advantages to this approach to estimating wage rigidity. First, it uses
cross-sectional and time variation in the position of the wage change distribution to
identify wage rigidity, rather than relying solely on cross-sectional variation within
each period. Second, in contrast to typical histogram location approaches to esti-
mating wage rigidity in the literature, this wage rigidity estimator uses wage changes
both above and below the median to estimate the counterfactual distribution. Third,
it performs well regardless of whether the median wage change is above or below zero,
a situation that can be problematic for estimators that rely only on cross-sectional
variation in the wage change distribution within a period.
The estimates suggest that wage rigidity prevents 24.5 percent of wage cuts at
the average establishment, with a standard deviation of 23.5 percent across establish-
ments. Establishments in the construction and transportation supersectors display
the least wage rigidity, with average levels of 3.2 percent and 11.5 percent of wage
cuts prevented, respectively. Establishments in the public administration supersector
display the most wage rigidity, with an average level of 45.9 percent of wage cuts
prevented.
The paper establishes a clear empirical relationship between wage rigidity and
employment outcomes. Because the data allow for the observation of employment
flows at the individual level, including into and out of unemployment, layoffs, quits,
8
and hires may be imputed with minimal assumptions. An establishment with the
sample-average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have a 0.7 percentage point
higher layoff rate, a 1.8 percentage point lower quit rate, and a 1.3 percentage point
lower hire rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity.2 Wage rigidity amplifies
layoffs at establishments with shrinking revenues and dampens hires at establishments
with gorwing revenues. Given a one standard deviation decrease in revenue growth,
an establishment with average wage rigidity is predicted to increase its layoff rate by
1.5 percentage points more than an establishment with no wage rigidity. Given a one
standard deviation increase in revenue growth, an establishment with average wage
rigidity is predicted to increase its hire rate by 2.6 percentage points less than an
establishment with no wage rigidity.
A significant advatange of this paper is that the administrative, individual-level
wage data is a measure of total compensation that includes base salary, bonuses, and
other forms of compensation. Previous studies focus on wage rigidity in base pay
only due to data limitations. One can imagine, however, that establishments may
avoid the implications of wage rigidity in base pay on employment outcomes through
altering bonuses. Thus, a complete examination of the relationship between wage
rigidity and employment outcomes should include a measure of total compensation
as this paper does.
Using the empirical results to estimate the structural model via indirect inference
suggests that wage rigidity reduces the average establishment’s profits by 3.3 percent.
The estimates suggest that the average establishment faces a per-worker menu cost
of 774 euros annually of cutting nominal wages.
Several previous studies have documented the existence of wage rigidity in mi-
croeconomic datasets. Prominent examples using U.S. data include Card and Hyslop
(1997), and Kahn (1997). Kahn (1997) estimates that wage earners experience nom-
2For comparison, the sample average layoff rate is 4.5 percent, the sample average quit rate is
9.2 percent, and the sample average hire rate is 17.2 percent.
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inal wage reductions 47 percent less often than they would in the absence of wage
rigidity. Daly and Hobijn (2013) show that the proportion of workers reporting a
zero nominal wage change in the United States increased in the recent recession, from
12 percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2011. Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (1999) estimate
that, even accounting for benefits such as cash bonuses and health insurance, wage
rigidity prevents 30 percent of reductions in total nominal compensation that would
otherwise occur. Using European data, Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) conclude that
wage rigidity prevents 37 percent of counterfactual wage cuts in the Euro area, and 28
percent of wage cuts in Germany specifically. Dickens et al. (2007) examine evidence
in the United States and 15 European countries, and find that the fraction of workers
covered by wage rigidity is 28 percent on average, ranging from 4 percent in Ireland
to 58 percent in Portugal.
It has been difficult, though, to establish a link between wage rigidity and em-
ployment outcomes. Card and Hyslop (1997) find that “...nominal rigidities have
a small effect on the aggregate economy...,” while Altonji and Devereux (2000) re-
port, “Our estimates of the effect of nominal wage rigidity on layoffs and promotions
... are too imprecise for us to draw any conclusions.” Daly and Hobijn (2013) find
that their model of nominal wage rigidity generates wage dynamics that are con-
sistent with recent U.S. data, although their use of the Current Population Survey
prevents them from studying the micro-level relationship between wage rigidity and
employment outcomes. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) find that wage rigidity
makes a statistically insignificant difference in macroeconomic time series estimates
of a Phillips Curve equation in the postwar period. Lebow et al. (1999) estimate
that the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment is positively correlated with
inflation, contrary to what would be predicted by an important role for nominal wage
rigidity. They describe the apparent contradiction between the evidence on the ex-
tent of wage rigidity and the lack of evidence that it affects employment outcomes
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as a “micro-macro puzzle”. An exception to this pattern is Kaur (2012), who finds
strong causal effects of wage rigidity on employment levels in informal agricultural
labor markets in India.
Two possible solutions to the micro-macro puzzle have been proposed. Barro
(1977) argues that in a long-term employment relationship, the wage at a particular
point in time is less important than the path of wages over the life of the relationship.
Therefore, apparently rigid wages may reflect optimal long-term contracting rather
than difficulties in wage adjustment, and may not have meaningful implications for
employment outcomes. Elsby (2009) notes that forward-looking, wage-setting firms
will compress wage increases in the presence of wage rigidity. Smaller wage increases
in good times reduce the need for wage cuts in the face of an adverse shock.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a model of establishment
decision-making in the presence of wage rigidity and derives predictions for the effects
of wage rigidity on layoffs, quits, and hires. Section 3 provides an overview of the
data set and basic descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces a method of measuring
wage rigidity at the establishment level and describes the distribution of wage rigidity
across establishments in the sample. Section 5 estimates the empirical relationship
between wage rigidity and layoffs, quits, and hires. Section 6 uses these results to esti-
mate the theoretical model by indirect inference, quantifies the costs of wage rigidity
to establishments, and conducts a series of counterfactual policy simulations under
various levels of the inflation rate. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Model of Establishment Decision Making with Wage
Rigidity
This section examines the dynamic wage and employment policies of a single
establishment with heterogeneous worker types facing an imperfectly competitive
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labor market.3 The establishment’s goal is to maximize its discounted stream of
expected future profits. The establishment experiences shocks to its marginal revenue
product of labor and faces costs of adjusting its stock of labor and wage rate.
2.2.1 Establishment Environment
The establishment has infinite life and uses one input to production, labor, of
which there are J distinct types. The establishment maximizes its discounted stream
of expected per period profits, where per period profits are given as:
Π =
J∑
j=1
(
ajn
α
j − wjnj − ch(hj, nj,−1)hj − c``j − g(wj, wj,−1)nj
)
where nj is the stock of type j labor used in production, α governs returns to scale,
and wj is the wage rate for type j labor. hj and `j are the number of type j employees
the establishment hires and lays off, respectively. ch(·) is a per employee hiring cost
function and c` is the cost per layoff. aj is a stochastic process that shifts the marginal
revenue product of labor.4 aj is the product of an establishment-wide productivity
level z and a type j productivity level uj.
Downward nominal wage rigidity enters the model through the wage adjustment
cost function, g (wj, wj,−1), which is specified in per-employee terms as a polynomial
in nominal wage reductions:
g (wj, wj,−1) = λ01(1+pi)wj<wj,−1 + λ1 (wj,−1 − (1 + pi)wj)1(1+pi)wj<wj,−1
+λ2 (wj,−1 − (1 + pi)wj)2 1(1+pi)wj<wj,−1 (2.1)
λ0 represents a fixed menu cost of cutting wages, while λ1 and λ2 represent linear and
3The analysis refers to an establishment rather than a firm to be consistent with the data set,
which provides establishment identifiers rather than firm identifiers. Theoretically, however, the
analysis would apply equally as well to a firm’s problem.
4aj may be conceptualized either as type j’s level of labor productivity or as the level of its
output price; the remainder of the paper refers to aj as productivity for concreteness’ sake.
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quadratic costs of wage cuts, respectively. pi represents the deterministic rate of price
inflation. Both wj and wj,−1 are specified in real terms, but the establishment bears
costs only when it cuts nominal wages. The nominal wage cut from the previous
period to the present period is last period’s real wage, wj,−1, less this period’s real
wage, wj, times the increase in the price level 1 + pi, when this difference is negative,
and zero otherwise. Thus, the cost of wage adjustment, g(·), is positive when nominal
wages are cut and zero otherwise. The cost of cutting nominal wages gives rise to
downward nominal wage rigidity in the model. This is the only place that nominal
variables enter the model. Otherwise, the establishment cares exclusively about real
payoffs, and all variables above are specified in real terms.
The model is agnostic regarding the precise mechanism generating wage rigidity in
the economy. Multiple sources of wage rigidity have been proposed in the literature.
Bewley (1999) emphasizes that wage cuts may reduce morale, thereby lowering worker
productivity. Similarly, Elsby (2009) and Kaur (2012) both model wage rigidity
as arising from reductions in morale associated with wage cuts. Hall and Milgrom
(2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2013) emphasize the role of the
bargaining process between employers and workers in insulating wages from business
cycle conditions. The sources of wage rigidity remain a topic of discussion in the
literature. However, this paper focuses on the consequences of wage rigidity rather
than its sources.
The establishment’s stock of type j labor evolves according to the equation:
nj = nj,−1 − δ(wj)nj,−1 + hj − `j
where δ(wj) is the quit rate of type j labor and hj, `j ≥ 0. The establishment faces
an imperfectly competitive labor market for each type of labor. The quit rate of type
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j labor is given by the function
δ (wj) = δ¯
(wj
w
)−γ
, γ > 0 (2.2)
where δ¯ is the economy-wide average quit rate. The quit rate is decreasing in the wage
rate, wj. γ governs the degree of competition in the labor market: as γ increases, the
quit rate becomes more sensitive to wages. In the limit as γ approaches infinity, the
labor market becomes perfectly competitive.
The establishment faces a cost per hire given by the function
ch(hj, nj,−1) = φ1
(
hj
nj,−1
)
+ φ2
(
hj
nj,−1
)2
(2.3)
The quadratic hiring cost function allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale
in the hire rate. Most studies of hiring costs indicate that they are subject to decreas-
ing returns to scale, for instance Shapiro (1986), Blatter, Muehlmann, and Schenker
(2008) and Muehlmann and Pfeifer (2013).
2.2.2 Solution to the Establishment’s Problem
Because the establishment’s profit function is a linear summation of the individual
type j profit functions, the dynamic optimization problem can be written separately
for each type of labor. For each labor type j, the establishment chooses the wage
rate, level of hires, and layoffs to solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
Vj (z, uj, wj,−1, nj,−1) = max
wj ,hj ,lj
ajn
α
j − wjnj − ch(hj, nj,−1)hj − c``j
−g(wj, wj,−1)nj + βE
[
Vj
(
z′, u′j, wj, nj
)]
(2.4)
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subject to
ln aj = ln z + lnuj (2.5)
ln z = (1− ψz) ln z¯ + ψ ln z−1 + εz, εz ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(2.6)
lnuj = (1− ψu) ln u¯+ ψ lnuj,−1 + εuj , εuj ∼ N
(
0, σ2uj
)
(2.7)
nj = (1− δ (wj))nj,−1 + hj − `j (2.8)
hj, `j ≥ 0 (2.9)
The Bellman equation has 4 state variables: establishment-level productivity, z, labor
type j-specific productivity uj, last period’s type j wage rate, wj,−1, and last period’s
type j labor stock, nj,−1. As specified in equations 2.6 and 2.7, both productivity
levels evolve according to a mean reverting, AR(1) process. The errors εz and εuj are
assumed to be independent.
The model solution uses standard value function iteration techniques to find the
establishment’s value and policy functions. The method of Tauchen (1986) approx-
imates the autoregressive process for the productivity levels z and uj. The model
estimation strategy uses the empirical results from section 5.4 of the paper. Thus, a
description of the model estimation is deferred until section 2.6.
2.2.3 Establishment Policy Functions and Simulations
Figure 2.1 displays the establishment’s policy functions in the case of perfectly
flexible wages, using the parameters decribed in section 2.6 but setting the cost of
wage cut parameters λ0, λ1, and λ2, to zero.
5 Panel A illustrates the establishment’s
wage policy function. The establishment pays lower wages when last period’s employ-
ment level is higher. With a higher previous level of employment, the establishment
can tolerate a higher quit rate while retaining enough employees to meet its desired
5The panels show the policy functions for a medium productivity level. The policy functions
depend quantitatively on the productivity level but are qualitatively similar.
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employment level, reducing the incentive to pay high wages. Panel B illustrates
the establishment’s employment policy function. As expected, the establishment’s
desired employment level increases with productivity and the last period’s level of
employment, but does not vary with the last period’s wage. Panel C illustrates the
establishment’s quit rate policy function, which the establishment controls deter-
ministically by setting the wage rate. The quit rate policy function varies inversely
with the wage policy function. It is increasing in last period’s employment level but
decreasing with productivity but does not vary with the previous wage. Panel D illus-
trates the establishment’s layoff policy function. In the absence of wage rigidity, the
establishment never finds it optimal to lay off employees: it is always more profitable
to lower wages, thus inducing quits, when employment is greater than desired. A key
feature of figure 2.1 is that when wages are perfectly flexible, all policy functions are
independent of the previous period’s wage.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the establishment’s policy functions with wage rigidity.6
Panel A shows the establishment’s wage policy function. The flat portion of the
policy function towards the front of the figure is the area where wage rigidity is not
binding because the optimal new wage is above the previous period’s wage. The up-
ward sloping portion is the area where wage rigidity binds and the establishment sets
the current period’s nominal wage equal to the previous period’s nominal wage.
Panel B shows that the establishment’s employment policy continues to be increas-
ing in the previous period’s employment level. However, the optimal employment level
now depends on the previous period’s wage. When wage rigidity binds, the resulting
higher wages discourage the establishment from employing as many workers.
Panel C illustrates that the establishment’s quit rate policy function remains in-
versely related to the wage policy function, consistent with equation (2.2). As before,
the quit rate increases in last period’s employment level. However, with rigid wages,
6Specifically, the cost of wage cut parameters λ0, λ1, and λ2, are set to their estimated values
as described in section 2.6.
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the quit rate decreases with the previous period’s wage in the area where wage rigidity
is binding. The higher wages in this area of the state space induce fewer quits.
Panel D shows that, in contrast to the policy functions in figure 2.1, an establish-
ment with rigid wages sometimes finds it optimal to lay off workers. Layoffs are never
optimal in areas where wage rigidity does not bind, but where wage rigidity binds,
the establishment responds by laying off workers. In those cases, the establishment
finds it more profitable to lay off workers than to pay the cost of cutting nominal
wages. This result is consistent with the intuition that wage rigidity leads to layoffs
that would not occur with perfectly flexible wages.
Figure 2.3 displays a simulated wage change histogram in the case of no wage rigid-
ity. As expected, the histogram is widely dispersed around the median and roughly
symmetrical. Wage cuts are as prevalent as would be be expected given a symmetri-
cal wage change distribution. Figure 2.4 displays a simulated wage change histogram
in the case of rigid wages.7 The distribution of wage changes is notably compressed
realtive to the case of flexible wages and clearly asymmetrical. The portion corre-
sponding to wage cuts is visibly compressed relative to the portion corresponding to
wage increases.
Figure 2.5 presents results from simulating the model holding all parameters fixed
except the wage rigidity parameters. The horizontal axis indexes the level of wage
rigidity in the simulations.8 The simulation uses 2,000 periods and drops the first
400 periods to allow for burn-in. Panel A shows the estimated level of wage rigidity
using the estimator described in section 2.4.1. This is the same estimator applied to
the actual data in section 5.4. Panel A shows that estimated wage rigidity increases
with the actual level of wage rigidity in the model. Panel B shows the average layoff
rate, which increases with wage rigidity. Panels C and D illustrate the average quit
7The λ parameters are again set to their estimated values from section 2.6.
8Specifically, the estimated λ parameters are each multiplied by the scale factors shown on the
axis.
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and hire rates, respectively, which both decrease with wage rigidity. Wage rigidity
reduces the quit rate by occasionally “holding up” wages above their flexible level,
thereby reducing worker turnover. The slower pace of worker turnover reduces the
establishment’s need to hire new workers as well. Forward-looking establishments
also realize that if they hire workers in good times, they may have to pay the costs
associated with wage rigidity, either from cutting nominal wages or from laying off
workers, in response to future negative shocks.9
Therefore, the model predicts that establishments with more rigid wages should
exhibit:
1. Higher layoff rates;
2. Lower quit rates; and
3. Lower hire rates.
Section 5.4 tests these three empirical predictions.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Overview of Dataset
The paper employs administrative and survey data from the Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB). The main analysis uses the Linked Employer-Employee Data
of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (LIAB), matched with the annual IAB Es-
tablishment Panel Survey. The LIAB includes 5,293 West German establishments
that participated in the annual IAB establishment survey each year either from 1999
9Theoretically, it is possible that the hire rate will increase with wage rigidity. However, this
situation does not arise when realistic parameter values are used in the model.
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through 2001 or from 2000 through 2002, and follows each such establishment every
year of its existence from 1997 through 2003.10
The LIAB also provides complete labor market biographies for each employee
liable to social security who was employed at a sampled, surveyed establishment
at any point between 1997 and 2003. The data set follows these workers’ entire
employment, unemployment, and wage histories from 1993 through 2007, even if the
workers move to an establishment outside the sample. The LIAB also provides the
exact dates that an employment spell begins and ends for an employee at a given
establishment.
The administrative nature of the individual worker data is an important advantage
for studying wage rigidity. Establishments provide the individual worker wage data to
the FDZ by law, and are subject to penalty for misreporting. Thus, the wage data for
each individual should theoretically be without measurement error. Establishment
identifiers and full employment samples for the surveyed establishments allow for the
accurate calculation of the wage change distribution for each establishment.
Reported wages are the average daily compensation over the employment spell and
include base salary and any bonuses, fringe benefits, or other monetary compensation
received throughout the spell or year. Thus, the wage reported in the data corresponds
more closely to a measure of total compensation than to a base wage rate. This more
inclusive wage concept is a significant advantage for studying the relationship between
employment adjustment and wage rigidity in light of Lebow et al.’s (1999) finding that
establishments are partially able to circumvent wage rigidity by adjusting ancillary
compensation.
The employment biographies provide information such as the start and end dates
of each employment spell and the reason for each employment notification (e.g. end
of or break in employment, required annual notification, etc.). Therefore, labor flows
10The East German establishments in the sample were excluded from the analysis.
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such as layoffs, quits, and hires may be imputed with minimal assumptions.
Additionally, the LIAB provides an extensive set of employment-related character-
istics such as the type of employment spell, professional and occupational status, and
white-collar versus blue collar. The worker biographies also include detailed individ-
ual characteristics, such as gender, birth year, nationality, education, and vocational
training. Finally, the annual IAB Establishment Panel Survey that is linked to the
LIAB provides a rich set of establishment characteristics, including information on
an establishment’s revenue or business volume, and the presence or absence of a work
council or wage bargaining agreement.
A disadvantage is that the dataset does not contain employee-level data on hours
worked; therefore, a reduction in hours may appear as a wage cut using the wage
measure in the data, the daily average wage rate. The data do distinguish between
part-time workers working less than half of full-time, those working more than half of
full-time, and full-time workers. The wage change distributions include only workers
whose hours status does not change between periods to minimize the potential for
measurement error. To the extent that this error still exists, it is likely to make wages
appear less downwardly rigid than in the absence of hours variation.
Another disadvantage of the dataset is that reported compensation is top-censored
at the contribution limit for the German social security system. Top-censoring affects
roughly 7 percent of workers in the sample; the analysis excludes these workers from
the sample for the purpose of estimating wage rigidity, but not for the purpose of
calculating employment flows.11
The analysis also uses the Establishment History Panel (BHP) as an additional
dataset. The BHP includes industry classification codes and state- and distrcit-
level location identifiers for each establishment. In additon, the BHP contains an
11The exclusion is necessary because workers with earnings above the contribution limit are all
assigned the same top-coded wage in a given year. Therefore, these workers’ wage changes would
not reflect their actual earnings but instead the change in the yearly contribution limit.
20
extension file with information on establishment births, deaths, and reclassifications.
Supplementary data in this extension allows for the identification of establishment
closures that are likely to be spin-offs or takeovers as opposed to true closures.
The final dataset used in the paper is the Sample of Integrated Labor Market
Biographies (SIAB). The SIAB provides complete labor market biographies for a 2
percent random sample of all employees liable to social security. However, the SIAB
does not provide worker biographies for all workers at a sampled establishment as
in the LIAB, nor is it linked to the Establishment Survey Panel. Therefore, the
paper focuses on the LIAB for the main analysis. However, because the SIAB is a
representative sample of the German workforce, the dataset provides an opportunity
to examine aggregate labor market statistics in section 2.3.3.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The analysis restricts the sample to the years 1997 through 2003, the period for
which the data includes worker biographies for all workers at the sampled establish-
ments. The analysis includes workers ages 20 through 60. The main unit of observa-
tion is the establishment-year. An establishment-year is excluded if the establishment
has less than 50 employees or 10 valid wage changes in the year. An establishment
is excluded altogether if it does not meet the criteria above for at least three years.
Additionally, the analysis requires data on establishment revenues in both the current
and previous years in order to calculate the establishment’s change in revenue. These
restrictions leave 2,250 establishments for the analysis.
Layoff, quit, and hire rates are measured as fractions of the establishment’s to-
tal workforce as of December 31st of the preceding year. Following a convention
for distinguishing involuntary layoffs and voluntary quits in the worker biographies
similar to that of Blein and Rudolph (1989) and Haas (2000), a layoff is defined as
an interruption between employment spells that results in the employee flowing into
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unemployment, as indicated by receipt of unemployment assistance, before the be-
ginning of another employment spell. Conversely, a quit is defined as an employment
interruption that does not contain an unemployment spell and results in an employee
flowing into another job without receipt of unemployment assistance. The beginning
of a new employment spell is classified as a hire if the employee’s immediately pre-
ceding spell was either unemployment or employment at another establishment.12 In
the data, there are many instances of a spell reported as ending, but after which the
worker resumes employment at the same establishment nearly immediately without
collecting unemployment assistance. These occurences are classified as neither quits
nor hires if the break between spells is less than 28 days. A separation is classified
as neither a layoff nor a quit if the worker’s biography contains neither a subsequent
employment spell nor subsequent receipt of unemployment assistance (for instance,
if the worker dies).13 This situation arises in less than one percent of separations.
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the layoff, quit, and hire rates for
the sample of establishments from 1997 through 2003. The average annual layoff
rate over the period is 4.5 percent with a standard deviation of 9.2 percent across
establishment-years. The average annual quit rate over the period is 9.2 percent with
a standard deviation of 14.7 percent. The average annual hire rate is 17.2 percent
with a standard deviation of 32.7 percent. The average establishment employs 549
workers, versus 219 workers for the median establishment. The average nominal wage
12A fourth possibility for employment adjustment is that of a “spin”, which can take the form of
either an inflow or an outflow. Spin employment flows are those that involve employment movements
either between establishments within a firm or a merger or acquisition of two establishments from
different firms. An example of an employment movement between establishments covered under the
former description is that of an establishment closure where a large proportion of employees from
the closed establishment moves directly to another establishment within the same firm. The FDZ
provides an extension file on establishment births, deaths, and reclassifications that allows for the
identification of spin employment flows. Because the study focuses on the relationship between wage
rigidity and the traditional employment flows, spin flows are excluded from the analysis.
13The establishment-level anlysis considers the period 1997 through 2003, but the worker bi-
ographies span the period 1993 to 2007, so most worker biographies extend beyond the end of the
analysis period.
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is 102.90 euros per day, with a standard deviation of 66.21 euros per day.14
The empirical strategy described in section 5.4 uses changes in establishment
revenues to proxy for shifts in the marginal revenue product of labor. Each year,
the survey asks each establishment to provide its total business volume (or sales)
in the preceeding fiscal year (i.e. from January 1 through December 31).15 The
average establishment-level revenue growth in the sample is 3.5 percent per year with
a standard deviation of 20.6 percent.
2.3.3 Aggregate Wage Change Distributions
The wage data from the SIAB provides a representative overview of wage changes
for job stayers during the period 1997 through 2003. Figure 2.6 shows the annual
aggregate nominal wage change distributions for this period. The plot labeled 2000
represents the distribution of wage changes from 1999 to 2000, et cetera.
Four conclusions are visually evident from observing the nominal wage change
histograms and are confirmed through simple tabulations. First, the aggregate nomi-
nal wage change distributions exhibit a clear spike at the histogram bin containing a
nominal wage change of zero (or the “zero bin” for short). The proportion of nominal
wage changes in the zero bin ranges from 11.32 percent to 15.45 percent, with an
average of 12.35 percent. Second, a nominal wage change of zero is the most common
nominal wage change over the sample period. Third, while nominal wage cuts cer-
tainly occur, they are less frequent when compared to nominally zero and nominally
positive wage changes. Further, it appears as if a part of the nominally negative
portion of the wage change distribution is “missing” when compared to its nominally
positive counterpart. From 1997 through 2003, the fraction of workers receiving a
14For the purposes of calculating these descriptive statistics, wages were imputed for top-coded
earners using a procedure provided by the FDZ.
15While the sample only covers establishments with full employment biographies from 1997
through 2003, the survey spans from 1993 through 2008. Thus, the 2004 survey records the es-
tablishment’s business volume from 2003, the 2003 survey records business volume from 2002, etc.
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nominal wage cut ranges from 14.88 percent to 21.32 percent, with an average of
18.46 percent.
Finally, the aggregate nominal wage change distributions exhibit a significant
“fall-off” in density from the zero bin to the nominally negative bin immediately to
the left of zero. For example, in the year 2003, the zero bin contains 15.45 percent
of all wage changes compared to only 4.84 percent in the bin immediately to the left,
a fall-off of 10.61 percentage points. Throughout the sample period, the fall-off in
density from the zero bin to the bin immediately to the left ranges from 6.17 to 10.61
percentage points and averages 7.90 percentage points. For comparison, the next
largest average fall-off between any two histogram bins is 2.91 percentage points and
only eight bins exhibit an average fall-off of more than one percentage point. This
evidence suggests the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity in the aggregate
German economy. The paper now turns to measuring the degree and extent of wage
rigidity across German establishments.
2.4 Estimating Wage Rigidity
2.4.1 Methodology
Previous studies have proposed several methods of measuring downward nominal
wage rigidity. However, those studies have measured wage rigidity at the aggregate
level, whereas this study measures wage rigidity at the establishment level. The small
size of many of the establishments in the sample poses a problem for these approaches
in the context of this paper. The approach in this paper takes elements from Card and
Hyslop (1997) and Kahn (1997), modified for the context of much smaller samples.
Figures 2.7 through 2.10 illustrate the approach.
For each establishment i, let mit represent the median wage change from time
t − 1 to time t expressed in percentage points. Then measure the proportion of
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wage changes in each year in one percentage point wide bins. Let propijt, for j ∈
{−10,−9,−8, ...,−1, 1, ..., 8, 9, 10}, denote the size of the bin that is between j and
j + 1 percentage points away from the median wage change for that year. Figure
2.7 illustrates these measurements for a simulated establishment.16 For example,
j = −1 represents the bin between the median wage change and the median wage
change minus one percent in each year, whereas j = 1 represents the bin between the
median wage change and the median wage change plus one percent. In year 1, the
median wage change is 2.9 percent, and bin j = −1 contains wage changes between
1.9 percent and 2.9 percent, whereas bin j = 1 contains wage changes between 2.9
percent and 3.9 percent. The median wage change always separates bins j = −1 and
j = 1. However, the bin j containing nominal zero will vary with the median wage
change over time. For instance, in year 1 the nominal wage change of zero lies in bin
j = −3, which includes wage changes between -0.1 percent and 0.9 percent; in year 2,
the median nominal wage change is 6.8 percent, and the nominal wage change of zero
lies in bin j = −7. The analysis excludes all bins more than 10 percentage points
from the median each year.
For each establishment, estimate the regression
propijt = δ0 + δ1|j|+ δ2j2 + it, j +mit > 0, ∀t (2.10)
The regression in equation (2.10) restricts the sample to bins that reflect nominal
wage increases only, and excludes the bin containing wage changes of nominal zero,
as illustrated in figure 2.8. A data point in this regression is the proportion of wage
changes in bin j, in year t, at establishment i. The regression pools the data across
years within an establishment. Thus, for the simulated establishment in figure 2.8,
the regression in (2.10) contains 74 data points, as there are a total of 74 nominally
16The data user agreement with the FDZ prohibits displaying the wage change histograms for a
single establishment, necessitating the use of a simulated establishment for the illustration.
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positive wage change bins across all six years. |j| and j2 represent the linear and
quadratic distances from the median wage change, respectively. Therefore, equation
(2.10) expresses the nominally positive portion of the wage change distribution as a
quadratic function of the distance from the median wage change each year.
Next, this estimated function is used to predict what the nominally negative por-
tion of the wage change distribution would be in the absence of wage rigidity. The
estimated coefficients from equation (2.10) are used to predict the values p̂ropijt for
the bins that contain negative wage changes, again excluding the bin that contains
wage changes of nominal zero.17 For example, in year 1 of figure 2.9, proportions are
predicted for bins j = −4 through j = −10.
These predicted values are used to estimate the regression
propijt = γi × p̂ropijt + uijt, j +mit + 1 < 0, ∀t (2.11)
Equation (2.11) regresses the observed proportion of wage changes in bins corre-
sponding to nominal wage cuts on the proportions that would be predicted from the
regression in equation (2.10). Figure 2.10 illustrates how the regression operates. The
dark bars in the nominally negative portion of the distribution represent the observed
proportion of wage changes in these bins, while the light bars represent the predicted
proportions of wage changes in these bins. γˆi represents the fraction of predicted
wage cuts observed in the data. The measure of establishment-level wage rigidity is
the proportion of counterfactual wage cuts that are “missing” from the data and is
calculated as
ŵri = 1− γ̂i (2.12)
Therefore, the wage rigidity estimate in equation (2.12) is a time-invariant charac-
17In cases where propijt would be predicted to be negative, p̂ropijt is set to zero.
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teristic of the establishment. ŵri has the natural interpretation that a value of 0.25
implies that 25 percent of counterfactual nominal wage cuts at establishment i were
prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity over the sample period.18
There are three major advantages to this approach to estimating wage rigidity.
First, it uses cross-sectional and time variation in the position of the wage change
distribution to identify wage rigidity, rather than relying solely on cross-sectional
variation within each period. Second, in contrast to typical histogram location ap-
proaches to estimating wage rigidity in the literature, this wage rigidity estimator
uses wage changes both above and below the median to estimate the counterfactual
distribution. Third, it performs well regardless of whether the median wage change is
above or below zero, a situation that can be problematic for estimators that rely only
on cross-sectional variation in the wage change distribution within a period. This
situation arises in 8.02 percent of the establishment years in the sample.
This approach implicitly assumes that an establishment’s counterfactual wage
change distribution is symmetrical and has a constant variance across years. Card
and Hyslop (1997) argue that, “...symmetry is a natural starting point for building
a counterfactual distribution. ...if the individual wage determination process is sta-
tionary, then symmetry holds.” It is also worth noting that the aggregate German
wage change distributions shown in appendix B in section 2.9 appear to be roughly
symmetrical around the median in the high inflation years of the late 1970s and early
1980s. When inflation is high, a smaller proportion of the wage change distribution
is pushed against nominal zero compared to periods of low inflation. Thus, the shape
of the wage change distribution in high inflation periods is likely to be indicative
of the shape of the counterfactual distribution that would prevail in the absence of
downward nominal rigidity.
18Nothing in this procedure prevents ŵri from being negative. A value for ŵri of -0.25 would imply
that there are 25 percent more wage cuts in the data than would be predicted by the distribution
of nominally positive wage changes.
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A potential drawback of this approach is that it also implicitly assumes the nom-
inally positive portion of the wage change distribution is unaffected by wage rigidity
in order to predict the nominally negative portion. As emphasized by Elsby (2009),
theory suggests that wage rigidity should affect the nominally positive portion of the
wage change distribution as well as the nominally negative portion. Specifically, wage
increases should be compressed in the presence of wage rigidity. This compression
is evident in simulations of the theoretical model presented in section 2.2, as well.
Monte Carlo simulations of the estimator presented here suggest that it is unbiased
both with and without compression in the wage change distribution. Intuitively, this
is because the estimator only attempts to estimate the fraction of counterfactual wage
cuts prevented by wage rigidity, and not their magnitudes.
The Monte Carlo simulations suggest that there is some sampling error associated
with the estimator. This samplng error will lead to attenuation bias in the estimates of
the association between wage rigidity and employment outcomes presented in section
5.4. Therefore, the estimates of these associations are likely to underestimate the
strength of the true associations. Please see appendix A in section 2.8 for a discussion
of the Monte Carlo simulations.
2.4.2 The Distribution of Wage Rigidity in West Germany
Table 2.2 shows the mean, median, and standard devation of the distribution of
wage rigidity estimates for individual establishments within the sample. The aver-
age establishment-level measure of wage rigidity is 24.5 percent, implying that wage
rigidity prevents 24.5 percent of counterfactual wage cuts at the average establish-
ment. The standard deviation of the estimates is 23.5 percent and the median is
21.8 percent. Thus, there is both a notable degree of estimated wage rigidity among
establishments and significant variation across establishments.
Table 2.2 also shows the mean, median, and standard devation of the distribu-
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tion of wage rigidity estimates within each of the ten supersectors of the economy to
provide context as to where wage rigidity is present. The mean and median levels
of wage rigidity vary widely across supersectors, with little difference between the
mean and median within supersectors. The variation within supersectors, as mea-
sured by the standard deviation across establishments, ranges from 19 percent to 34
percent. Among supersectors, public administration exhibits the highest degree of
wage rigidity, with an average of 45.9 percent of wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity
across establishments. Administration, finance, and energy/water also display large
amounts of wage rigidity, with an average of 35.5, 31.1, and 28.9 percent of wage cuts
prevented, respectively. Construction, transportation, and mining/manufacturing ex-
hibit the smallest degree of average wage rigidity, with 3.2 percent, 11.5 percent, and
12.8 percent of nominal wage cuts prevented, respectively.
2.5 Wage Rigidity and Employment Adjustment
2.5.1 Empirical Approach
The predictions from the theoretical model in section 2.2.3 imply empirical regres-
sions of the form:
yit = β0 + β1wri +X
′
itΥ + it (2.13)
where the unit of observation is an establishment-year. yit represents an employment
adjustment variable of interest: the layoff rate, the quit rate, or the hire rate. wri
represents the estimated percentage of wage cuts prevented by downward nominal
wage rigidity, as discussed in section 2.4.1. Xit represents a vector of control variables,
including a dummy for the presence of a work council, the median year-over-year
percentage wage change, a set of year, state, and sector fixed effects, dummies for
establishment size groups, the fraction of the workforce that is female, and controls
29
for workforce educational attainment and occupation. Estimates of equation (2.13)
are presented in column 1 of tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, for layoffs, quits, and hires,
respectively. Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 illustrate the economic interpretation of these
estimates.
It is natural to examine whether the association between wage rigidity and em-
ployment adjustment varies according to the economic shocks an establishment faces.
In the theoretical model presented in section 2.2, layoffs are a response to negative
shocks to the marginal revenue product of labor, while hires are a response to positive
shocks to the marginal revenue product of labor.19 Although the data do not permit
explicit observation of marginal revenue product of labor shocks, data on revenue
growth is likely to be informative about such shocks. Assuming changes in revenue
growth reflect primarily shifts in the marginal revenue product of labor suggests the
following additional specification for examining the relationship between wage rigidity
and employment outcomes:
yit = β0 + β1wri + β2posrevit + β3negrevit
+ β4 (wri × posrevit) + β5 (wri × negrevit) +X ′itΥ + it (2.14)
The variables posrevit and negrevit denote the year-over-year percentage change in
revenue; posrevit is set to zero when this change is negative, while negrevit is set
to zero when this change is positive. Specifying the change in revenue this way
allows the estimation of a linear spline function over revenue growth, permitting dis-
parate associations between revenue growth and employment adjustment depending
on whether revenue growth is positive or negative.20 The variables (wri × posrevit)
19These responses can persist over time after the initial shock. Whether positive and negative
shocks should have disparate relationships with quits is ambiguous in the model.
20The specification of revenue growth as a linear spline function with a kink at zero is similar to
the specification of Holzer and Montgomery (1993), who also interpret changes in sales growth as
reflecting primarily shifts in demand.
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and (wri × negrevit) are interactions between estimated establishment wage rigid-
ity and revenue growth, capturing possible interactions between wage rigidity and
changes in revenue.
Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 present three sets of results for each outcome variable.
Column (1) presents estimates of equation (2.13). Column (2) presents estimates
of equation (2.14) without the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms. Col-
umn (3) presents estimates of equation (2.14) including wage rigidity-revenue growth
interaction terms. All regressions are weighted by establishment-year employment.
Regression weights are likely to be appropriate for two reasons: first, because the es-
timate of wage rigidity is likely to be less noisy at larger establishments; and second,
because larger establishments employ a much larger percentage of the total workforce,
and thus their behavior has a larger effect on the aggregate economy.
2.5.2 Layoffs
Table 2.3 shows results from the layoff regressions. In column (1), the estimated
coefficient on the wage rigidity variable is 2.9 percent and statistically significant.
The sign is consistent with the predictions presented in section 2.2.3: establishments
with higher degrees of wage rigidity exhibit higher layoff rates. Adding positive and
negative revenue growth as regressors in column (2), the coefficient on estimated wage
rigidity is again 2.9 percent and statistically significant. In column (3), which adds
interactions between wage rigidity and revenue growth, the coefficient on the level of
estimated wage rigidity is 2.5 percent and statistically significant. The coefficients on
the uninteracted revenue growth terms are statistically insignificant, as is the coeffi-
cient on the interaction between wage rigidity and positive revenue growth. However,
as suggested by the model, the coefficient on the interactions between wage rigidity
and negative revenue growth is negative 19.3 percent and highly significant. Because
negrevit enters the regression as a weakly negative number, the negative coefficient
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on the interaction implies that an establishment with more rigid wages exhibits more
layoffs when its revenue declines than an establishment with less rigid wages.
Figure 2.11 shows the economic interpretation of these coefficients. The horizon-
tal axis measures the estimated level of wage rigidity for an establishment, and the
vertical axis measures the predicted increase in the layoff rate for an establishment
relative to the case of no wage rigidity. The solid line in figure 2.11 presents the
economic interpretation of the layoff regression results from column (1) of table 2.3
with no revenue variables or interaction terms. An establishment with the sample
average level of wage rigidity of 24.5 percent is predicted to have a 0.7 percentage
point higher layoff rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity. This difference
corresponds to a 15.9 percent increase over the 4.5 percent sample average layoff rate.
An establishment with estimated wage rigidity of 48 percent, one standard deviation
above the sample average, is predicted to have a 1.4 percentage point higher layoff
rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity, an increase of 30.9 percent relative
to the average.
The dashed line in figure 2.11 presents the economic interpretation of the layoff
regression results from column (3) of table 2.3, which include the revenue variables
and the interaction of the revenue variables with wage rigidity. Specifically, the line
shows an establishment’s predicted increase in the layoff rate relative to the case of
no wage rigidity given a negative, one standard deviation (-20.6 percent) movement
in revenue growth. Including the revenue interaction terms in the empirical model
significantly amplifies the positive relationship between estimated wage rigidity and
layoffs. An establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity and a one
standard deviation negative movement in revenue growth is predicted to have a 1.5
percentage point higher layoff rate relative to an establishment with no wage rigidity,
corresponding to a 34.5 percent increase. Further, an establishment with estimated
wage rigidity one standard deviation above the sample average is predicted to have
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a 3.0 percentage point higher layoff rate, corresponding to a 66.7 percent increase in
the layoff rate relative to the sample average.
2.5.3 Quits
Table 2.4 shows results from the quit regressions. In column (1), the estimated
coefficient on the wage rigidity variable is -7.2 percent and statistically significant.
This sign is consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model, as establish-
ments with higher degrees of wage rigidity exhibit lower quit rates. In column (2), the
coefficient on estimated wage rigidity is also -7.2 percent and statistically significant.
In column (3), the coefficient on estimated wage rigidity is negative 5.2 percent and
statistically significant. The coefficients on the interactions between wage rigidity and
revenue growth imply that firms with more wage rigidity are predicted to experience
fewer quits in response to an increase or decrease in revenue, although the coefficient
on the negative revenue movement interaction is not statistically significant.
Figure 2.12 shows the economic interpretation of the coefficients in the quit rate
regressions. The horizontal axis measures the estimated level of wage rigidity for an
establishment, and the vertical axis measures the predicted decrease in the quit rate
for an establishment relative to the case of no wage rigidity. The solid line presents
the economic interpretation of the quit rate regression results from column (1) of table
2.4 with no revenue variables or interaction terms. An establishment with the sample
average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have a 1.8 percentage point lower quit
rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity, which corresponds to a 19.3 percent
decrease relative to the 9.2 percent sample average quit rate. An establishment with
one standard deviation higher than average wage rigidity is predicted to have a 3.5
percentage point lower quit rate relative to the case with no wage rigidity, which
corresponds to a 38.0 percent decrease.
The dashed line in figure 2.12 presents the economic interpretation of the quit rate
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regression results from column (3) of table 2.4, which include the revenue variables
and the interaction of the revenue variables with wage rigidity. The line shows an es-
tablishment’s predicted decrease in the quit rate relative to the case of no wage rigidity
given a one standard deviation negative movement in revenue growth. However, the
specification including the revenue interaction terms is not statistically distinguish-
able from the specification that does not include the revenue interaction terms, and
the difference is not economically meaningful.
2.5.4 Hires
Table 2.5 shows results from the hire regressions. In column (1), the estimated
coefficient on the wage rigidity variable is -5.3 percent and statistically significant.
This coefficient implies that establishments with greater wage rigidity exhbit lower
hire rates, as predicted by the theoretical model. In column (2), the coefficient on
estimated wage rigidity is -5.9 percent and statistically significant. In column (3), the
coefficient on measured wage rigidity is -5.3 percent and statistically significant. The
coefficient on the interaction between wage rigidity and positive revenue growth has
the expected negative sign and is statistically significant. Establishments with more
wage rigidity are predicted to engage in fewer hires when revenue increases.
Figure 2.13 shows the economic interpretation of the coefficients in the hire rate
regressions. The horizontal axis of figure 2.13 measures the estimated level of wage
rigidity for an establishment, and the vertical axis measures the predicted decrease in
the hire rate for an establishment relative to the case of no wage rigidity. The solid
line in figure 2.13 presents the economic interpretation of the hire regression results
from column (1) of table 2.5 with no revenue variables or interaction terms. An
establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have a 1.3
percentage point lower hire rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity, which
corresponds to a 7.5 percent decrease relative to the 17.2 percent sample average hire
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rate. An establishment with one standard deviation higher than average wage rigidity
is predicted to have a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the hire rate relative to the
case with no wage rigidity, which corresponds to a 14.8 percent decrease in the hire
rate relative to the sample average.
The dashed line in figure 2.13 presents the economic interpretation of the hire re-
gression results from column (3) of table 2.5, which include the revenue variables and
the interaction of the revenue variables with wage rigidity. The line shows an estab-
lishment’s predicted decrease in the hire rate relative to the case of no wage rigidity
given a positive one standard deviation movement in revenue growth. Including the
revenue interaction terms in the empirical model significantly amplifies the negative
relationship between estimated establishment level wage rigidity and the hire rate.
An establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity and a one standard
deviation positive movement in revenue growth is predicted to have a 2.6 percentage
point lower hire rate than an establishment with no wage rigidity, which corresponds
to a 14.8 percent decrease in the hire rate relative to the sample average. Further,
an establishment with one standard deviation higher than average wage rigidity is
predicted to have a 5.0 percentage point decrease in the hire rate, corresponding to
a 29.1 percent decrease in the hire rate relative to the sample average.
2.6 Model Estimation
This paper employs a combination of methods to choose the parameters of the
theoretical model described in section 2.2. The parameters β, pi, α, δ, w, γ, ln z¯,
ψz, σ
2
z , u, λ1, and c` are calibrated externally or estimated directly from the LIAB
microdata used throughout the paper. The parameters λ0, λ2, ψu, σ
2
u, φ1, and φ2
are estimated via indirect inference to match a set of simulated moments to their
empirical counterparts in the LIAB microdata. The model period is taken to be one
year.
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2.6.1 Calibrated Parameters
Table 2.6 shows the values of the calibrated parameters. The inflation rate, pi,
of 1.33 percent is the average rate of consumer price inflation in Germany over the
period 1997 through 2003 from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
The establishment discount rate β is calibrated from the World Bank’s WDI tables
to match the average German real lending interest rate for the period 1997-2002. The
nominal lending interest rate is defined as the bank rate that meets the short- and
medium-term financing needs of the private sector, and averages 9.5 percent for the
period.21 The real interest rate is calculated as the nominal rate minus the average
inflation rate of 1.33 percent. β is then calibrated as 1
1+0.095−0.0133 , or 0.924. The
parameter c` is taken to match German redundancy costs from the World Bank’s
Cost of Doing Business project, taking the average of the cost for workers with 1
year of tenure and workers with 5 years of tenure. To expedite the estimation, the
parameter λ1 is set to zero. The parameter u¯ is normalized to 1. The average quit rate
δ and the average nominal daily wage w are taken directly from the microdata sample.
δ is the average quit rate across establishment-years, 9.2 percent. The average daily
wage is 102.90 euros.
The returns-to-scale parameter α is chosen to match labor’s average share of value
added across all establishment-years in the microdata. For each establishment-year,
the establishment’s total wage bill is calculated from the worker biographies. The
establishment’s value added is calculated as total revenues minus intermediate inputs
and external costs.22 The theoretical model in section 2.2 abstracts from intermediate
21See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LEND/countries?page=2 for more detail.
The rate is not available for 2003.
22Each year, the establishment survey panel includes a question regarding the share of revenue
attributable to external costs. For instance, in the 2002 survey the question read:
What share of sales was attributed to intermediate inputs and external costs in 2001,
i.e. all raw materials and supplies purchased from other businesses or institutions,
merchandise, wage work, external services, rents and other costs (e.g. advertising
and agency expenses, travel costs, commissions, royalties, postal charges, insurance
premiums, testing costs, consultancy fees, bank charges, contributions to chambers of
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inputs, so there is no distinction in the model between revenue and value added. In
the microdata, it is necessary to adjust for intermediate inputs to calculate labor’s
share of value added accurately. Labor’s share of value added per establishment-year
is simply the establishment’s total wage bill divided by revenue less external costs.
Averaging labor’s share of value added across establishment-years yields an estimate
of 0.65 for the parameter α.
The parameter γ is the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to wages in equation
(2.2) from section 2.2.1. This equation is difficult to estimate directly due to its non-
linearity in the wage, but a first-order Taylor’s expansion yields the following linear
approximation around the average wage, w:
δ(w)− δ ≈ −δγ
(
w − w
w
)
(2.15)
Equation (2.15) expresses the deviation of the establishment-year quit rate from
the average quit rate as a decreasing function of the percentage deviation of the
establishment-year wage from the economy average wage.23 Taking equation (2.15)
to the data requires accounting for worker and establishment heterogeneity that is
not present in the theoretical model.24 A Mincer regression of individual log wages on
worker and establishment observable characteristics allows for the removal of observ-
able heterogeneity.25 Thus, the residual from this regression provides a “cleansed”
measure of the deviation of individual log wages from the market average. Averaging
these residuals at the establishment-year level provides a log approximation to the
trade and commerce and professional associations)?
23Although the quit rate function in equation 2.2 is linear in logs, estimating the equation in logs
is not feasible because quits are zero in some establishment-years.
24Neglecting to account for heterogeneity may yield biased inference if wages are correlated with
other determinants of the quit rate. For example, if non-wage amenities such as pleasantness of the
job are reflected in compensating wage differentials, a naive estimate of γ that does not account for
heterogeneity will be biased toward zero.
25The covariates included in the Mincer regression are a set occupation dummies, a set of edu-
cation dummies, gender, nationality, age and age squared, a set of year fixed effects, federal state,
and a set of sector dummies.
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term
(
w−w
w
)
in equation (2.15).
To estimate equation (2.15), establishment-year quit rates minus the average quit
rate were regressed on the average Mincer residuals, and a set of establishment and
year fixed effects. The inclusion of establishment fixed effects identifies γ off of time
series variation in wages within establishments, rather than cross-sectional variation in
wages across establishments, which helps to account for the possible trade-off between
wages and amenities. The estimated coefficient in regression equation (2.15) is -
0.53, which corresponds to −δγ. Dividing the estimated coefficient by −δ yields an
estimated γ of 5.75.
The average establishment-wide level of productivity, ln z¯, and the persistence,
ψz, and variance, σ
2
z , of establishment-wide productivity shocks are estimated from
the LIAB microdata using information on value added, V Ait, and the returns-to-scale
parameter α calculated above. Using the measures of value added and the estimate
of α described above, ln(V Ait) − α ln(nit) is regressed on a set of worker covariates,
year fixed effects, and establishment fixed effects. The regression results allow for the
calculation of annual establishment-level average productivity, pit. Assuming the law
of large numbers holds, the average level of uijt in the sample will be 1 each year,
implying zit = pit. Regressing pˆit on pˆi,t−1 and a set of establishment fixed effects
yields estimates for the persistence of the establishment-level productivity process,
ψz, and the variance of establishment-level productivity shocks, σ
2
z .
2.6.2 Estimated Parameters
The wage cut cost function parameters λ0 and λ2, the persistence and variance of
shocks to worker-type productivity ψu and σ
2
u, and the hiring cost function parameters
φ1 and φ2 are estimated through indirect inference to match a set of simulated mo-
ments from the theoretical model to their empirical counterparts in the data sample.
For a given guess of these parameters, the establishment’s optimal policy functions
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are computed and a series of wage change distributions and employment outcomes
are simulated using a set of random shocks. Applying the same method of measur-
ing establishment wage rigidity used in the empirical results to the simulated wage
change distributions yields an estimate of wage rigidity for the establishment in the
simulated data, wˆrs. For each guess of the wage rigidity parameters, the same pro-
cedure is implemented nine times, by multiplying the wage rigidity parameters by a
multiplicative factor increasing linearly from zero to two, and the simulated measure
of wage rigidity is calculated along with the simulated layoff, quit, and hire rates for
each of the nine simulations. Regressing the simulated layoff, quit, and hire rates
on wˆrs, as in equation 2.13 from section 2.5.1, yields the regression coefficients on
wage rigidity, βˆs =
[
βˆ`
s
βˆq
s
βˆh
s
]′
, from the simulated data. Therefore, the indirect
inference approach provides four natural targets to match from the data: βˆ`, βˆq, βˆh,
and wˆr. Identifying the remaining model parameters requires additional moments
from the data. These additional target moments are the predicted increase in the
layoff rate associated with wage rigidity from the regression in column (1) of table
2.3,26 the average hire rate in the data sample, the average wage level, the standard
deviation of wage changes for job stayers, and the magnitude of the average negative
wage change in the data sample.27
While there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the target moments and
the estimated parameters, λ0 and λ2 are identified primarily by the average level of
measured wage rigidity wˆr and the magnitude of the average negative wage change in
the sample. The empirically estimated level of wage rigidity reflects the total cost of
wage rigidity the establishment faces. Given the total cost of wage rigidity, the average
negative wage change identifies how much of the cost stems from the menu cost wage
26In other words, 0.029 times the average measured level of wage rigidity, 0.245, or 0.7 percent.
This quantity is used as a target rather than the sample average layoff rate because the only source
of layoffs in the model is wage rigidity. Presumably, there are additional causes of layoffs in the real
economy.
27All of the simulated moments except for βˆs are taken from the single simulation in which the
multiplicative factor on the wage rigidity parameters equals one.
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adjustment term, λ0, and how much from the quadratic wage adjustment cost, λ2. If
the quadratic adjustment cost predominates, the establishment will be willing to cut
wages by only a small amount and the magnitude of the average negative wage change
will be small. If, however, the menu cost predominates, the establishment will exhibit
few small negative wage changes and the negative wage changes the establishment
does make will be large on average.
The worker-type productivity shock parameters ψu and σ
2
u are identified mainly
by the predicted increase in the establishment layoff rate associated with wage rigidity
and the standard deviation of the average wage change. The hiring cost parameters φ1
and φ2 are identified mainly by the average hiring rate and average wage. Inclusion of
the wage rigidity regression coefficients β`, βq, and βh, serves two purposes. First, the
regression coefficients provide additional discipline on the estimated model parameters
by ensuring that the relationships between wage rigidity and employment outcomes
hold in the estimated model. Second, the regression coefficients help to correct for
any possible model misspecification, in the sense that the regression coefficients are
generated using the same procedure in the model as in the data.
With nine target moments from the data and six parameters to estimate, the
model is over identified. The parameters are estimated by minimizing the sum of the
squared percent deviations of the simulated moments from their empirical counter-
parts.28 Table 2.7 shows the empirical and simulated moments using the estimated
parameters. The model matches most target moments reasonably well. It notice-
ably underpredicts the establishment hire rate and the magnitude of the regression
coefficient on wage rigidity in the hire regression.
28More formally, let θ be a vector of the six structural parameters to be estimated and µ be a
vector of the nine target moments. Let µˆs(θ) be the corresponding simulated moments for any guess
of the parameters θ. Then the estimated structural parameters are
θˆ = arg min
θ
[µˆs(θ)− µ]′W−1[µˆs(θ)− µ]
where W is an nine by nine diagonal weighting matrix with the squared target moments as its
entries.
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Table 2.8 shows the estimated parameter values along with standard errors. The
persistence and variance of worker-type productivity shocks are 0.767 and 0.507, re-
spectively, implying that shocks to individual worker types are larger and more per-
sistent than shocks to overall establishment productivity. The estimated hiring cost
parameters, φˆ1 and φˆ2, require context to be useful. Applying the estimated values
to the hiring cost function in equation 2.3 at the simulated average hire rate of 9.5
percent yields a per-employee hiring cost of 8.9 weeks of total compensation, broadly
consistent with Muehlman and Pfeifer’s (2013) estimate of more than 8 weeks of
wages for skilled German workers. The positive estimate for φ2 implies that there are
diseconomies of scale in hiring, also consistent with Muehlman and Pfeifer (2013).29
The estimated wage cut cost parameters, λˆ0 and λˆ2, imply that the average cost of
a simulated wage cut is 1,238 euros. In the model simulations, wage rigidity reduces
profits by 3.3 percent at the average establishment. Approximately 63 percent of
the cost stems from the fixed cost λ0 and approximately 37 percent stems from the
quadratic adjustment cost λ2.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between downward nominal wage rigidity
and employment outcomes theoretically and empirically using German administrative
data. A novel contribution of the paper is the use of linked establishment-employee
data to measure wage rigidity and employment adjustment at the establishment level.
Establishment-level wage rigidity estimates suggest a substantial amount of downward
nominal wage rigidity in Germany, with an average of 24.5 percent of counterfactual
wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity. The paper introduces a theoretical model
of an establishment’s wage and employment decisions in the face real resource cost
29At the sample average hire rate of 17.2 percent, implied hiring costs are 18.8 weeks of total
compensation.
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for cutting nominal wages. The model predicts that more rigid wages should be
associated with a higher layoff rate and lower quit and hire rates.
The empirical analysis is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
An establishment with the sample average level of measured wage rigidity is predicted
to have a 0.7 percentage point higher layoff rate, a 1.8 percentage point lower quit rate,
and a 1.3 percentage point lower hire rate than an establishment with no measured
wage rigidity. The relationship between wage rigidity and employment outcomes is
generally amplified by movements in establishment revenue. An establishment with
the sample average level of wage rigidity and a one standard deviation decrease in
revenue growth is predicted to have a 1.5 percentage point higher layoff rate relative
to an establishment with no wage rigidity. An establishment with the sample average
level of wage rigidity and a one standard deviation increase in revenue growth is
predicted to have a 2.6 percentage point lower hire rate than an establishment with
no wage rigidity.
Using the empirical results to estimate the structural model via indirect inference
suggests that wage rigidity reduces the average establishment’s profits by 3.3 percent.
The estimates suggest that the average establishment faces a per-worker menu cost
of 774 euros annually of cutting nominal wages.
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Figure 2.1: Establishment Policy Functions with No Wage Rigidity
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Figure 2.2: Establishment Policy Functions with Wage Rigidity
48
Figure 2.3: Wage Change Distributions with No Wage Rigidity
Figure 2.4: Wage Change Distributions with Wage Rigidity
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Figure 2.5: Simulated Moments with Different Levels of Wage Rigidity
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Figure 2.6: Aggregate Wage Change Distributions 1997 to 2003
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of Wage Rigidity Estimator
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Figure 2.8: Illustration of Wage Rigidity Estimator: Estimating Counterfactual Dis-
tribution
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of Wage Rigidity Estimator: Counterfactual Negative Wage
Changes








	



	




	








1

0
,	
∀

54
Figure 2.10: Illustration of Wage Rigidity Estimator: Estimating Missing Wage Cuts
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Figure 2.11: Layoff Regressions – Economic Significance
Figure 2.12: Quits Regressions – Economic Significance
56
Figure 2.13: Hires Regressions – Economic Significance
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Table 2.1: Establishment-Level Descriptive Statistics
Number of Establishments 2,250
Sample Size, Establishment-Years 9,230
Mean Layoff Rate 0.045
(0.092)
Mean Quit Rate 0.092
(0.147)
Mean Hire Rate 0.172
(0.327)
Mean Employees per Establishment 549
(1,211)
Median Employees per Establishment 219
Mean Daily Wage, Level 102.899
(66.207)
Median Daily Wage, Level 90.729
Average Revenue Growth 0.035
(0.206)
Standard deviations in parentheses where applicable.
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Table 2.2: Establishment-Level Wage Rigidity Estimates
Mean Median Standard Deviation
All Establishments 0.245 0.218 0.235
Supersector:
Agriculture 0.132 0.094 0.320
Mining/Manufacturing 0.128 0.104 0.217
Energy/Water 0.289 0.268 0.283
Construction 0.032 0.034 0.190
Trade/Foodservice 0.212 0.173 0.284
Transportation 0.115 0.104 0.234
Finance 0.311 0.303 0.222
Real Estate 0.216 0.151 0.340
Public Administration 0.459 0.490 0.270
Administration 0.355 0.398 0.306
Estimated Wage Rigidity
Wage rigidity is estimated as discussed in section 4. The wage rigidity estimator 
is a fixed characterisitic of the establishment and estimates which fraction of 
nominal wage cuts were prevented due to downard nominal wage rigidity. 
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Table 2.3: Wage Rigidity and Layoffs – Regression Results
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Table 2.4: Wage Rigidity and Quits – Regression Results
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Table 2.5: Wage Rigidity and Hires – Regression Results
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Table 2.6: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
α Returns to Scale in Production 0.650 Labor’s Share of Value Added
δ Average Quit Rate 0.092 Average Sample Quit Rate
w Average Daily Wage 103 Average Sample Wage
γ Wage Elasticity of Quit Rate 5.75 Auxiliary Regression
ln z¯ Average Establishment-Wide Productivity 4.03x105 Auxiliary Regression
ψz Persistence of Establishment-Wide Productivity 0.096 Auxiliary Regression
σ2z Variance of Establishment-Wide Productivity Shock 0.325 Auxiliary Regression
cl Firing Cost 4,695 Redundancy Costs
u¯ Worker Type Productivity 1 Normalization
pi Deterministic Inflation Rate 0.013 Average Inflation
β Establishment Discount Rate 0.924 Real Interest Rate
λ1 Linear Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment 0 Choice
The parameters for returns to scale in production, the average quit rate, the average daily wage, the wage elasticity
of the quit rate, average establishment-wide productivity, the persistence of establishment-wide productivity, and the
variance of the establishment-wide productivity shock are estimated through a series of empirical regressions and
sample averages directly from the data, described in sections 2.3 and 2.6. The persistence of worker type productivity,
the variance of the worker type productivity shock, the hiring cost parameters, and the nominal wage adjustment
cost parameters are estimated by indirect inference as described in section 2.6. Firing costs are set to match German
redundancy costs from the World Bank’s Doing Business project, taking the average of the cost for workers with 1
year of tenure and workers with 5 years of tenure. The deterministic inflation rate is the average consumer price
inflation rate from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The real interest rate is the “lending interest
rate” from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators minus the calibrated inflation rate.
Table 2.7: Empirical and Simulated Moments
Moment Sample Value Simulated Value
Layoff Regression Coefficient on Wage Rigidity 0.029 0.037
Quit Regression Coefficient on Wage Rigidity
-0.072 -0.038
Hire Regression Coefficient on Wage Rigidity
-0.053 -0.014
Average Wage Rate 102.90 99.23
Standard Deviation of Percentage Wage Change 0.074 0.041
Measured Level of Wage Rigidity 0.245 0.285
Predicted Increase in Layoff Rate Associated with Wage Rigidity 0.007 0.011
Average Hire Rate 0.172 0.095
Average Negative Wage Change
-0.042 -0.028
The coefficients on wage rigidity in the layoff, quit, and hire regressions are from column 1 of tables 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively. Measured level of wage rigidity is mean wage rigidity for all establishments from table 2, calculated as 
described in section 4.
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Table 2.8: Estimated Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
ψu Persistence of Worker Type Productivity 0.767
(0.087)
σ2u Variance of Worker Type Productivity Shock 0.507
(0.133)
φ1 Linear Hiring Cost 5.29x104
(2.26x104)
φ2 Quadratic Hiring Cost 1.35x105
(6.48x104)
λ0 Menu Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment, Euros 774
(149)
λ2 Quadratic Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment, Euros 2.88x10−4
(1.74x10−5)
Parameters are estimated by the indirect inference procedure described in section 2.6.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix
2.8 Appendix A: Monte Carlo Simulations of Wage Rigidity
Estimator
This section tests the performance of the estimator of wage rigidity proposed in
section 3 using Monte Carlo simulations. We simulate wage change distributions for
500 establishments facing different levels of wage rigidity and generate the number
of years’ worth of wage changes observed in the sample for each establishment as a
random integer uniformly distributed between three and seven. Next, we generate
the number of employees per establishment as a random integer uniformly distributed
between 15 and 500; the number of employees is fixed over the simulation period.
For each establishment we generate the proportion of nominal wage cuts that will
be prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity as a random variable uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, 1]: wri ∼ U [0, 1].
To simulate counterfactual nominally flexible wage change distributions for each
establishment in each year, begin by drawing the mean of the establishment-year
wage change distribution from a normal distribution with a mean of four percent
and a standard deviation of four percent: µit ∼ N(.04, .042). We draw the standard
deviation of the counterfactual wage change distribution from a uniform distribution
over the interval [0 .05]: σit ∼ U [0, .05]. We then draw the counterfactual flexible
wage changes for each year from the normal distribution ∆ lnwcfijt ∼ N(µit, σ2it), where
∆ lnwcfijt is the counterfactual flexible log wage change of individual j at establishment
i from year t− 1 to year t.
Wage rigidity is introduced by replacing proportion wri of the counterfactual neg-
ative wage changes with positive wage changes that are distributed N(.001, .005) to
allow for prevented wage cuts to result in wage changes that are not exactly equal
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to zero. Wage cuts are chosen to replace randomly: there is no tendency for smaller
wage cuts to be more likely to be prevented, for example. Finally, compression in
the wage change distribution in the face of wage rigidity is introduced by multiplying
counterfactual wage changes by a compression factor of 1 − 0.5wri. That is, wage
changes at an establishment with no wage rigidity will not be affected by wage com-
pression, while wage changes at an establishment with 100 percent wage rigidity will
be compressed by 50 percent. Introducing wage compression does not substantially
change the simulation results.
The simulations use a reduced form method of simulating the wage change dis-
tributions in order to test whether the estimator of ŵri provides unbiased estimates
of the true wri in a setting in which a constant fraction of counterfactual wage cuts
are prevented by wage rigidity. In contrast, there is not a direct correspondence in
the theoretical model presented in sections 5 and 7 between the cost of wage adjust-
ment parameters λ0, λ1, and λ2 and a fixed proportion of counterfactual wage cuts
prevented.
Figure 2.14 displays the estimated and actual proportions of counterfactual wage
cuts prevented by wage rigidity in these simulations. A regression of the form
ŵri = α + βwri + ui (2.16)
gives an estimate for αˆ of 0.036 with a standard error of 0.024 and an estimate for
βˆ of 0.982 with a standard error of 0.041. Therefore, αˆ and βˆ are not statistically
distinguishable from 0 and 1, respectively. We interpret these results as suggesting
that this estimator of wage rigidity is likely to be unbiased in this context. The
standard error of the regression is 0.24, nearly equal in magnitude to the standard
deviation of the true amount of wage rigidity, which is 0.29. As discussed in the main
text, this noise is likely to cause attenuation bias in the estimates of the relationship
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between wage rigidity and employment outcomes, meaning the true associations are
likely to be larger than estimated in this paper.
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Figure 2.14: Monte Carlo Simulations of Wage Rigidity Estimates
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2.9 Appendix B: Aggregate German Wage Change Distribu-
tions, 1976-2005
This section displays the aggregate German wage change distributions from 1976
to 2005. The data is taken from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies
(SIAB) described in section 5.3. The dataset contains a 2 percent random sample
of workers liable to social security in West Germany during the sample period. The
histograms display nominal percent wage changes for job stayers. The sample includes
workers whose earnings are top-censored at the social security contribution limit; these
workers are excluded from the histograms as their true wage is not known.
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Figure 2.15: Aggregate Wage Change Distributions 1976 to 1990
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Figure 2.16: Aggregate Wage Change Distributions 1991 to 2005
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CHAPTER III
Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes:
Theory
3.1 Introduction
This paper explores the theoretical relationship between downward nominal wage
rigidity and employment outcomes at the establishment decision making level. This
paper provides the simple analytics of the model from chapter 2 that novelly models
wage rigidity through a downward nominal wage adjustment cost function.
The analytics of the model show that as the cost of cutting nominal wages increases
for an establishment, the establishment reduces its wage bill in response to a negative
shock through laying off workers and reducing hires. Further, the model shows that
downward nominal wage rigidity keeps the wages of its marginal workers above their
marginal product and thus above the wage the marginal workers would receive in a
fully flexible environment (and the wage the marginal worker would receive in the
open market), reducing the rate of quits at an estabishment. The reduction in the
quit rate thereby requires an even larger increasing in layoffs and reduction in hires
by the establishment to optimally reduce its wage bill.
This paper then calibrates the model and performs a series of counterfactual policy
simulations to study the effects of varying degrees of inflation on establishment profits
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and layoffs, quits, and hires in the presence of wage rigidity. The counterfactual policy
simulation implies that inflation mitigates the costs of wage rigidity, as increasing
the inflation rate reduces the profit reduction associated with wage rigidity from a
3.3 percent loss at the sample average annual inflation rate of 1.3 percent, to a 1.7
percent loss at an annual inflation rate of 5 percent. Further, the counterfactual
policy simulation show that inflation can “grease the wheels” of the labor market, as
higher levels of inflation facilitate real wage cuts even when nominal wage cuts are
costly to achieve.
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) find that wage rigidity makes a statistically in-
significant difference in macroeconomic time series estimates of a Phillips Curve equa-
tion in the postwar period. Lebow et al. (1999) estimate that the non-accelerating
inflation rate of unemployment is positively correlated with inflation, contrary to
what would be predicted by an important role for nominal wage rigidity.
Barro (1977) argues that in a long-term employment relationship, the wage at a
particular point in time is less important than the path of wages over the life of the
relationship. Therefore, apparently rigid wages may reflect optimal long-term con-
tracting rather than difficulties in wage adjustment, and may not have meaningful
implications for employment outcomes. Elsby (2009) notes that forward-looking,
wage-setting firms will compress wage increases in the presence of wage rigidity.
Smaller wage increases in good times reduce the need for wage cuts in the face of
an adverse shock.
The model in this paper incorporates the Elsby (2009) wage-compression effect, as
it examines the optimal dynamic wage and employment decisions of an establishment
that faces a real resource cost of cutting nominal wages. When this cost is large
enough, the establishment will not cut wages in response to a negative shock to the
marginal revenue product of labor, but will lay off workers instead. However, the
effect of wage rigidity is not limited to the layoff margin of employment adjustment.
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When wage rigidity prevents workers’ wages from being cut, the workers will be
less likely to quit. Prospective difficulties in cutting wages in the future also reduce
forward-looking establishments’ incentive to hire workers in the present. The model
predicts that wage rigidity has meaningful effects on short-run employment outcomes,
consistent with the empirical results.
Fehr and Goette (2005) use firm-level data from two Swiss firms (a large firm and
a medium-sized firm) from the 1990s (a period of low inflation in Switzerland) to show
that nominal wage rigidity is robust in a low inflation environment, constituting a
considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments, and that the lack of nominal wage cuts
due to wage rigidity correlate strongly to unemployment. This paper contributes to
this portion of the literature by using a large sampe of establishments with individual-
level wage data to quantify the relationship between the effects of wage rigidity and
inflation.
Finally, this paper indirectly relates to a literature studying the sources of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. Capbell III and Kamlani (1997) survey 184 firms to
investigte the sources of wage rigidity and find reducing turnover through quits, im-
plicit contracts, and preventing reductions in effort associated with wage cuts as the
primary reasons firms are hesitant to cut nominal wages. Bewley (1999) surveys over
300 executives and business leaders asking why firms and establishments appear to be
reluctant to reduces its workers nominal wages and shows that a fear in the reduction
of worker morale associated with wage cuts would reduce worker effort and thereby
reduce worker productivity. While the theoretical model remains agnostic as to the
sources of wage rigidity, a reduction in worker morale and worker effort, implicit con-
tracts, and costs associated with worker turnover are consistent with the notion that
cutting nominal wages is costly to the firm and establishment. This paper contributes
by examining whether those costs can be mitigated through increases in inflation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 derives the analytics of the estab-
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lishment decision making problem in the presence of wage rigidity and explores the
model’s theoretical underpinnings. Section 3.3 performs a series of counterfactual
poilicy simulations under various levels of the inflation rate to study whether infla-
tion “greases the wheels” of the labor market. Section 5.6 concludes.
3.2 Simple Analytics of the Establishment Decision Making
Model with Wage Rigidity
This section provides the simple analytics of the partial equilibrium, establishment
decision making model with wage rigidity proposed in section 2 of chapter 2. The
model contains J heterogeneous worker types within a representative establishment.
For simplicity, however, the analytical results of this section will suppress the J worker
types and solve the establishment’s problem as if workers are homogenous. Since each
of the worker types, j, solve identical dynamic optimization problems, the analytical
results presented here will be mostly identical1 to the dynamic optimization problem
solved by each worker type, j in chapter 2.
The infinitely-lived, representative establishment uses one input of production,
labor, and maximizes the discounted stream of expected per period profits,
Π = pnα − wn− ch(h, n−1)h− c``− g(w,w−1)n
where n is the stock of labor used in production, α governs returns to scale in produc-
tion, w is the wage rate labor, h and ` are the number of employees the establishment
hires and lays off, and ch(·) and c` are costs of hiring and layoffs of labor, respectively.
1The only difference between the optimzation problem solved in chapter 2 and that solved in
this chapter comes in the form of the prodctivity process. With heterogeneous workers types, each
worker type, j, has a productivity process, uj , that interacts with an establishment-level productivity
process, z, to give overall worker productivity, pj . Since all workers are homogenous in this section,
overall worker productivity will be p across all workers. Accordingly, this section only models a
productivity process, p, and makes no mention to processes z and u. This simplification does not
affect the results.
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g(·) is the cost of wage adjustment for labor, while p shifts the marginal revenue prod-
uct of labor. p may be conceptualized as either the level of labor productivity or the
level of its output price; for concreteness, this paper refers to p as productivity. The
establishment is assumed to be concerned exclusively with real payoffs, and all vari-
ables above are specified in real terms. The rate of price inflation enters the model
through the cost of wage adjustments function as described below.
The establishment chooses the current wage rate, w, level of hires, h, and level of
layoffs, `, to solve the following dynamic optimization problem:
V (p, w−1, n−1) = max
w,h,l
pnα − wn− ch(h, n−1)h− c``
−g(w,w−1)n+ βE [V (p′, w, n)] (3.1)
subject to
ln p = (1− ψp) ln p¯+ ψ ln p−1 + εp, εp ∼ N
(
0, σ2p
)
(3.2)
n = (1− δ (w))n−1 + h− 1+` (3.3)
g (w,w−1) = λ01(1+pi)w<w−1 + λ1 (w−1 − (1 + pi)w)1(1+pi)w<w−1
+λ2 (w−1 − (1 + pi)w)2 1(1+pi)w<w−1 (3.4)
where (3.2) is the establishment’s productivity process, which evolves according to a
mean-reverting, AR (1) process with error term, εp, (3.3) is the labor stock equation
of motion, and (3.4) is the cost function of cutting wages facing the establishment
and is how downward wage rigidity enters the model.
The paramterized functional form of the quit rate of labor is
δ (w) = δ¯
(w
w
)−γ
, γ > 0
where δ¯ is the economy-wide average quit rate, and γ governs the degree of compe-
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tition in the labor market: as γ increases, the quit rate becomes more sensitive to
wages. The establishment also faces quadratic costs of hiring labor, given by
ch(h, n−1) = φ1
(
h
n−1
)
+ φ2
(
h
n−1
)2
which allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale.
The analytics of the estbalishment decision making model under wage rigidity
on around the wage cutting cost function, g (·), in (3.4). Note that (3.4) only takes
a non-zero value when the establishment cuts the nominal wage from the previous
period (i.e. when (1 + pi)w < w−1) and zero everywhere else. Therefore, g (·) is not
a smooth function with a kink at the zero wage change and not differentiable when
(1 + pi)w = w−1. It follows that the derivative of g (·) with respect to the current
period wage rate, w, takes the following piecewise form:
∂g (w,w−1)
∂w
=

0 if (1 + pi)w > w−1
undefined if (1 + pi)w = w−1
−
(
1 + pi
)[
λ1 + 2λ2
(
w−1 − (1 + pi)w
)]
if (1 + pi)w < w−1
(3.5)
The intuition from (3.5) is straightforward: If the establishment raises the workers’
wages, then no cost of wage adjustment is incurred. If the establishment cuts the
workers’ wages, then the cost of wage adjustment increases linearly in λ1 and increases
quadratically in λ2.
Similarly crucial to the analytics is how the labor stock equation of motion, (3.3),
changes as the current period wage rate, w, changes. Differentiating (3.3) with re-
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sprect to w yields
∂n (w, h)
∂w
= −∂δ (w)
∂w
n−1
= −
[
(−γ) δ¯
(w
w¯
)−γ−1( 1
w¯
)]
n−1
=
( γ
w¯
)
δ¯
(w
w¯
)−γ (w¯
w
)
n−1
∂n (w, h)
∂w
=
( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1 > 0 (3.6)
That is, the evolution of the establishment’s labor stock depends positively on the
wage rate. As the current period’s wage rate increases, the number of quits in the
current period (as a fraction of the end of the previous period’s employment, n−1)
falls, and the establishment retains a larger portion of its workforce. The term,(
γ
w
)
, in (3.6) captures the effect that the establishment’s competitiveness in the labor
market has on the evolution of the labor stock: as the establishment becomes more
competitive, it will retain more of its workers.
Since the model is a discrete choice problem, the establishment will never find it
optimal to both hire workers and lay off workers in the same period.2 Therefore, the
analysis of this section is partitioned into five distinct cases: Case 1 presents the case
of no layoffs and wage increases (` = 0, g (·) = 0). Case 2 presents the case with no
layoffs and wage cuts (` = 0, g (·) > 0). Case 3 presents the case of no layoffs and
wages unchanged (` = 0, g (·) = 0, ∂g(·)
∂w
is undefined). Case 4 presents the case of
layoffs and wages unchanged ((` > 0, h = 0, g (·) = 0, ∂g(·)
∂w
is undefined). Case 5
presents the case of layoffs and wage cuts (` > 0, h = 0, g (·) > 0).3
2The model presented in chapter 2 achieves both hires and layoffs in the same period through
the heterogeneous J worker types. Distinct worker types experience hires and layoffs, but a single
group worker type, j, will never experince both hires and layoffs in a given period.
3There is not a sixth case where an establishment both lays off workers and increases the wage.
For an establishment that is laying off workers, wages must be less than or equal to w−1, as there
is no need to keep wages high to recruit and keep workers while the establishment actively reduces
its workforce. Therefore, an establishment laying off workers must either keep wages unchanged or
reduce wages in the model.
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3.2.1 Case 1: No Layoffs, Nominal Wage Increases (` = 0, g (w,w−1) = 0)
In the case of no layoffs (` = 0) and wage increases, (3.1) becomes
V (p, w−1, n−1) = max
w,h
pnα − wn− ch(h, n−1)h+ βE [V (p′, w, n)] (3.7)
The establishment chooses the current wage rate, w, and the level of hires, h, to
solve its dynamic optimization problem. Further, ` = 0 implies that the labor stock
equation of motion constraint, (3.3), becomes
n = (1− δ (w))n−1 + h (3.8)
so that the current period labor stock, n, is simply the number of workers retained
from the previous period plus the number of workers hired.
Solving the establishment’s dynamic optimization problem yields the following
first order condition with respect to the wage rate, w:
∂V
∂w
: αpnα−1
∂n
∂w
− n− w ∂n
∂w
+ βE
[
∂V ′
∂w
]
= 0
=⇒ αpnα−1
( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1 +
( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1 × · · ·
βE
[
αp′n′α−1
(
1− δ (w′)
)
+ φ1
(
h′
n
)2
+ 2φ2
(
h′
n
)3 ]
= · · ·
n+ w
( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1 + · · ·( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1βE
[(
w′ + g (w′, w)
)(
1− δ (w′)
)]
+ · · ·
βE
[
n′
∂g (w′, w)
∂w
]
(3.9)
where
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g (w′, w)

0 if (1 + pi)w′ ≥ w
λ0 + λ1
(
w + (1 + pi)w′
)
+ λ2
(
w − (1 + pi)w′
)2
if (1 + pi)w′ < w
(3.10)
and
∂g (w′, w)
∂w

0 if (1 + pi)w′ > w
undefined if (1 + pi)w′ = w[
λ1 + 2λ2
(
w − (1 + pi)w′)] > 0 if (1 + pi)w′ < w
(3.11)
The first order condition in (3.9) implies that the establishment sets the wage so that
the marginal benefit of the wage change equals the marginal cost. The left-hand side
of (3.9) shows the marginal benefit of a wage increase to the establishment. The
first term on the left-hand side of (3.9) is the extra output associated with retaining
more workers from a wage increase induced lower quit rate. The second term on
the left-hand side of (3.9) is the continuation value of the extra output from those
workers in future periods. An increase in the wage lowers this period’s quit rate,
and the establishment carries those workers into the future period. Those workers
produce output in the future period if the future wage rate, w′, does not induce
those workers to quit in the future period. The third term on the left-hand side of
(3.9) is the continuation value of the current period’s wage increase on future hiring
costs. Increasing wages today increases the establishment’s stock of labor, n, through
reducing quits and carries that stock into the future period. A larger stock of labor,
n, carried into the future period reduces the future period’s hiring costs, c (h′, n), as
hiring costs are decreasing in the stock of labor.
The right-hand side of (3.9) shows the marginal cost of a wage increase to the
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establishment. The first two terms on the right-hand side of (3.9) show the establish-
ment’s total cost, this period, of the wage increase, as the establishment now pays
all workers a higher wage. The third term on the right-hand side of (3.9) is the con-
tinuation cost of increasing wages today in the form of future wage costs. Increasing
wages in the current period reduces the current period quit rate and increases the
stock of labor, n, the establishment brings into the future period. When the wage
increases in the current period, fewer workers quit and the establishment’s stock of
labor, n, carried into the future period increases. Of those workers who do not quit
in the future given the future wage, w′, the establishment pays them w′ and must
pay g (w′, w) from (3.10) if the establishment cuts the nominal wage from the current
period to the future period. If the nominal wage change from the current to the
future period is zero or positve, then g (w′, w) is zero as shown in (3.10), and the
establishment only pays the wage rate, w′, to those workers in the future.
The fourth and final term on the right-hand side of (3.9) is the continuation cost
of increasing wages today in the form of future costs to cutting wages that increasing
the wage in the current period imposes on the establishment in the future. The per
worker cost of cutting wages in the future period, g (w′, w), is weakly increasing the
the current period’s wage, w, as shown in (3.11). If the establishment finds itself in a
future productivity state that requires a wage cut, the cost of cutting the wage in the
future period will be greater if the establishment increases the wage today than if the
establishment did not increase the wage today. This term represents the Elsby (2009)
effect of wage rigidity: forward-looking establishments will dampen wage increases in
the current period knowing that the establishment will have to pay a future cost of
cutting wages in response to a future adverse shock.
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The first order condition with respect to hires, h, yields
∂V
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: αpnα−1
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∂h
− w∂n
∂h
− · · ·[
ch (h, n−1) +
∂ch (h, n−1)
∂h
h
]
+ βE
[
∂V ′
∂h
]
= 0
=⇒ αpnα−1 + · · ·
βE
[
αp′n′α−1
[
1− δ (w′)
]
+ φ1
(
h′
n
)2
+ 2φ2
(
h′
n
)3]
= · · ·
w +
[
2φ1
(
h
n−1
)
+ 3φ2
(
h
n−1
)2]
+ · · ·
βE
[[
w′ + g (w′, w)
][
1− δ (w′)
]]
(3.12)
where ∂n
∂h
= 1. The first order condition in (3.12) implies that the establishment
will recruit workers to the point where the marginal benefit of the hires equals the
marginal cost. The left-hand side of (3.12) shows the marginal benefit of the hires.
The first term is the extra output produced by the hired workers in the current
period. The second term is the continuation value of the hires through both the
expected increase in output the hired workers that do not quit produce in the future
period and the expected reduction in the future period’s total hiring costs associated
with an increase in n. The right-hand side of (3.12) shows the marginal costs of the
hires. The first term on the right-hand side of (3.12) is the cost the establshment
incurs in the form of wages to employ the hires, whereas the second term captures
the hiring costs incurred by the establishment to hire the new workers. The third
term on the right-hand side of (3.12) is the continuation cost of hires in the form of
expected future wages. If the workers hired in the current do not quit in the future
period, the establishment must pay the workers wage w′, and, if the establishment
cuts the workers wage in the future period, the establishment must pay the nominal
wage adjustment cost as described in (3.10).
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3.2.2 Case 2: No Layoffs, Nominal Wage Cuts (` = 0, g (w,w−1) > 0)
When the establishment cuts wages but does not lay off workers, it incurs a cost
g (w,w−1). Thus, the value function takes the form
V (p, w−1, n−1) = max
w,h
pnα − wn− ch(h, n−1)h
−g (w,w−1)n+ βE [V (p′, w, n)] (3.13)
The establishment chooses the current wage rate, w, and the level of hires, h, to solve
its dynamic optimization problem. Since ` = 0 as in section 3.2.1, the labor stock
equation of motion remains as stated in (3.8).
Solving the establishment’s dynamic optimization problem in the case of wage
cuts yields the following first order condition with respect to the wage rate, w:
∂V
∂w
: αpnα−1
∂n
∂w
− n− w ∂n
∂w
− · · ·(
∂g (w,w−1)
∂w
n+ g (w,w−1)
∂n
∂w
)
+ βE
[
∂V ′
∂w
]
= 0
=⇒ αpnα−1
( γ
w
)
δ (w)n−1 + · · ·
(1 + pi)
[
λ1 + 2λ2 (w−1 − (1 + pi)w)
]
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βE
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1− δ (w′)
)
+ φ1
(
h′
n
)2
+ 2φ2
(
h′
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w + g (w,w−1)
] ( γ
w
)
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+ · · ·
βE
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]
(3.14)
The intuition for (3.14) is similar to (3.9) in that the establishment will cut wages up
until the point where the marginal cost of cutting wages equals the marginal benefit.
The left-hand side of (3.14) shows the marginal cost to the establishment of cutting
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wages. The first term on the left-hand side of (3.14) represents the loss of output
for the establishment as a result of a wage cut induced increase in quits. The second
term on the left-hand side of (3.14) is the marginal cost the establishment pays in
order to execute the nominal wage cut for all workers, n. The third and final term
on the left-hand side of (3.14) represents the continuation cost of the wage cut in
the form of expected loss in future output and expected future hiring costs. As wage
induced quits increase this period, the establishment enters the next period with fewer
workers, all else equal. If the establishment experiences a high productivity state in
the future, it will have to hire more workers to meet the labor needs of the high
prouctivity state than if workers never quit. The additional hires lead to additional
hiring costs.
The right-hand side of (3.14) shows the marginal benefit to the establishment of
cutting wages. The first term on the right-hand side, n, is the number of workers
in the current period that take a wage cut and thus represents the decrease in the
establishment’s wage bill from all employed workers. The second term on the right-
hand side represents the decrease in the establishment’s wage bill as a result of the
wage cut induced quits. For the workers that quit, the establishment no longer has
to pay the wage rate, w, nor does the estbalishment have to pay the cost associated
with cutting those workers’ wages. The third term on the right-hand side of (3.14) is
the continuation value to the establishment for cutting wages this period in the form
of expected future wage savings from this periods wage induced quits. The final term
on the right-hand side is the continuation value of the nominal wage cut in terms of
paying the nominal wage adjustment cost in the future, where ∂g(w
′,w)
∂w
is defined in
(3.11). If the establishment cuts wages this period, it reduces the wage at which next
period’s nominal wage adjustment cost function binds, and thus makes it less likely
that the establishment pays the nominal wage adjustment cost in the future.
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The first order condition with respect to hires, h, in the case of wage cuts yields
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(3.15)
The left-hand side of (3.15) is the marginal benefit to the establishment for hiring,
and the intuition of the marginal benefit is the same as discussed with (3.12). The
right-hand side of (3.15) is the marginal cost to the establishment for hiring workers.
The intuition for the marginal cost of hiring is again the same as discussed with (3.12)
with one exception: the marginal cost of hiring now contains an additional term, g (·),
for the cost of cutting the hired workers’ wages.
3.2.3 Case 3: No Layoffs, Nominal Wages Unchanged (` = 0, g (w,w−1) =
0)
In the case of no layoffs and wages unchanged ((1 + pi)w = w−1), the value func-
tion is the same as (3.7) in case 1. However, a wage first order condition does not
exist when nominal wages are unchanged. The function, g (w,w−1), is not smooth at
w−1 and, thus, not differentiable. Therefore, the profit function is not differentiable
in w at w−1. The hires first order condition is unchanged from (3.12) in case 1, and
the intuition remains the same.
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3.2.4 Case 4: Layoffs, Nominal Wages Unchanged (` > 0, h = 0, g (w,w−1) =
0)
In the case of layoffs (` > 0) and no wage cuts from w−1, it must be the case that
(1 + pi)w = w−1 (nominal wages unchanged) and h = 0. When laying off workers, the
establishment has no need to keep wages high to recruit workers and keep employees.
Therefore, (3.1) becomes
V (p, w−1, n−1) = max
w,h
pnα − wn− c``+ βE [V (p′, w, n)] (3.16)
where g (w,w−1) = 0 since nominal wages are unchanged from w−1. The establish-
ment chooses the current wage rate, w, and the level of layoffs, `, to solve its dynamic
optimization problem. Further, ` > 0 and h = 0 imply that the labor stock equation
of motion constraint, (3.3), becomes
n = (1− δ (w))n−1 − ` (3.17)
so that the current period labor stock, n, is simply the number of workers retained
from the previous period less the number of workers the establishment lays off.
As in case 3, wages are unchanged ((1 + pi)w = w−1), g (w,w−1) = 0, and
∂g(w,w−1)
∂w
is undefinined at w−1. Therefore, the profit function is not differentiable at w−1 and
a wage first order condition does not exist.
The first order condition with respect to layoffs, `, yields
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(3.18)
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where ∂n
∂l
= −1.
The first order condition in (3.18) implies that the establishment will lay off work-
ers up until the point where the marginal marginal benefit of the layoffs equals the
marginal cost. The left-hand side of (3.18) shows the marginal benefit to the estab-
lishment of laying off workers. The first term on the left-hand side of (3.18) represents
the wage savings for the establishment as a result of not paying wages to laid off work-
ers. The second term on the left-hand side of (3.18) represents the continuation value
of the layoffs in the form of expected future wage savings: the establishment will not
have to pay the wage rate in the future period, w′, or the nominal wage adjustment
cost (if the establishment cuts the nominal wage in the future period) g (w′, w), for
the workers laid off in the current period that otherwise would not have quit.
The right-hand side of (3.18) shows the marginal cost to the establishment of
laying off workers. The first term on the right-hand side of (3.18) represents the
loss of output for the establishment as a result of laying off workers. The second
term on the right-hand side represents the firing cost the establishment must pay
for each layoff. The third term on the right-hand side of (3.18) is the continuation
cost to the establishment for laying off workers this period in the form of expected
future lost output and increased expected future hiring costs. As layoffs increase this
period, the establishment enters the next period with fewer workers, all else equal.
If the establishment experiences a high productivity state in the future, it will have
to hire more workers to meet the labor needs of the high prouctivity state than if th
establishment never laid off workers. The additional hires lead to additional hiring
costs.
3.2.5 Case 5: Layoffs, Nominal Wage Cuts (h = 0, g (w,w−1) > 0)
In the case of layoffs (` > 0) and nominal wage cuts from, it must be the case that
(1 + pi)w < w−1 and h = 0. When laying off workers, the establishment has no need
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to keep wages high to recruit workers and keep employees. Therefore, (3.1) becomes
V (p, w−1, n−1) = max
w,h
pnα − wn− c``− g (w,w−1)n+ βE [V (p′, w, n)](3.19)
where g (w,w−1) > 0 since the establishment cuts nominal wages from w−1. The
establishment chooses the current wage rate, w, and the level of layoffs, `, to solve
its dynamic optimization problem. Further, as in case 4 from section A.4, ` > 0 and
h = 0 imply that the labor stock equation of motion constraint remains as is in (3.17),
so that the current period labor stock, n, is simply the number of workers retained
from the previous period less the number of workers the establishment lays off.
Solving the establishment’s dynamic optimization problem in the case of wage
cuts yields the same first order condition with respect to the wage rate, w, as in
(3.14) from case 2 in section 3.2.2.
The first order condition with respect to layoffs, `, yields
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− c` − g (w,w−1) ∂n
∂`
+ E
[
∂V ′
∂`
]
= 0
=⇒ w + g (w,w−1) + βE
[(
w′ + g (w′, w)
)(
1− δ (w′)
)]
= αpnα−1 + · · ·
c` + βE
[
αp′n′α−1
(
1− δ (w′)
)
+ φ1
(
h′
n
)2
+ 2φ2
(
h′
n
)3]
(3.20)
where ∂n
∂l
= −1.
The intuition for (3.20) is the same as (3.18) in section 3.2.4 with the excep-
tion that the marginal benefit of a layoff now includes a term for the nominal wage
adjustment cost funciton, g (w,w−1). This term captures a key tradeoff for the es-
tablishment, as the establishment avoids paying the nominal wage adjustment cost
by instead laying off the worker.
88
3.3 Counterfactual Policy Simulation
The theoretical model can be used to conduct counterfactual policy simulations
that examine the effects of changes in the structural parameters on economic out-
comes. This section examines the effects of alternative deterministic inflation rates,
holding all other model parameters constant, including the cost of nominal wage cut
parameters λ0, λ1, and λ2. Specifically, the simulations study an alternative low in-
flation rate of 0 percent and an alternative high inflation rate of 5 percent relative to
the sample average, moderate inflation rate of 1.3 percent.
The model consists of 18 parameters. This chapter uses the calibration and es-
timation procedure discussed in section 6 of chapter 2 to pick the parameter values.
Table 3.1 shows the parameter values used in the counterfactual inflation policy sim-
ulations below.
Figure 3.1 displays the simulated wage change distribution from the model with
zero percent inflation. The asymmetry of this histogram is quite pronounced, and
there is a large spike at the wage change bin containing a nominal wage change of
zero. Furthermore, the distribution is highly compressed, displaying the forward-
looking effects of wage rigidity as put for by Elsby (2009).
Figure 3.2 displays the simulated wage change distribution from the model with
sample average, moderate inflation rate of 1.3 percent. The median nominal wage
change shifts to the right, consistent with the higher inflation rate relative to the
case in figure 3.1. The distribution of wage changes becomes slightly more dispersed,
though the compression associated with the Elsby (2009) effect is still starkly notice-
able.
Figure 3.3 displays the simulated wage change distribution from the model with
5 percent inflation. The median nominal wage change again shifts noticeably to the
right, consistent with the increase in inflation to 5 percent. The distribution also
becomes more symmetrical about the median and more dispersed, which is more
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reminiscent of a wage distribution with no wage rigidity, than of figures 1 and 2. This
change occurs because the higher inflation rate facilitates real wage cuts compared
to the lower inflation cases. This effect is visually evident in the histogram, as all
nominal wage changes less than 5 percent are real wage cuts.
Table 3.2 shows the results of these simulations for profits and employment out-
comes. Profits are lowest in the case of zero percent inflation, with a 4.1 percent
reduction compared to the perfectly flexible wage model. In the five percent inflation
case, profits are 1.7 percent lower than in the perfectly flexible wage model. The dif-
ferent inflation rates also yield different employment outcomes. The simulated layoff
rate declines from 1.2 percent in the case with 0 percent inflation to 0.7 percent in the
case with 5 percent annual inflation.4 The simulated quit rate rises from 12.1 percent
to 12.7 percent when inflation increases from 0 to 5 percent, and the simulated hire
rate rises from 9.4 percent to 9.7 percent. All of these movements are consistent with
the idea that higher inflation mitigates the effects of wage rigidity, thus providing
some evidence in support of the idea that inflation may “grease the wheels” of the
labor market. However, the model presented here does not address the welfare costs
of inflation, so a benefit-cost analysis of different inflation rates is beyond the scope
of this paper.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper explores the theoretical relationship between downward nominal wage
rigidity and employment outcomes at the establishment decision making level. This
paper provides the simple analytics of the novel model from chapter 2 that models
wage rigidity through a downward nominal wage adjustment cost function presented
in chapter 2. The model incorporates the Elsby (2009) effect that forward-looking
4It is worth recalling that wage rigidity is the only source of layoffs in the model, which is why
the simulated rates are smaller than the sample average layoff rate.
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firms incorporate future costs to cutting nominal wages by dampening wage increases.
However, the analytics of this model and its estimation shows that, even when incor-
porating the forward-looking behavior of firms, downward nominal wage rigidity still
leads to meaningful movements in layoffs, quits, and hires and reduces profits.
Using the calibrated and estimated model from chapter 2, this paper performs
a series of counterfactual policy simulations to study the effects of varying degrees
of inflation on establishment profits and layoffs, quits, and hires in the presence of
wage rigidity. Increasing inflation from a moderate level of 1.3 percent (the average
inflation rate over the sample period) to a high level of 5 percent leads to an increase in
establishment profits, a decrease layoffs, and an increase in quits and hires. Further,
the counterfactual policy simulation suggests that inflation can “grease the wheels”
of the labor market by facilitating real wage cuts even when nominal wage cuts are
costly to achieve.
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Figure 3.1: Wage Change Distributions with Wage Rigidity and 0 Percent Inflation
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Figure 3.2: Wage Change Distributions with Wage Rigidity and 1.3 Percent Inflation
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Figure 3.3: Wage Change Distributions with Wage Rigidity and 5 Percent Inflation
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
α Returns to Scale in Production 0.650 Labor’s Share of Value Added
δ Average Quit Rate 0.092 Average Sample Quit Rate
w Average Daily Wage 103 Average Sample Wage
γ Wage Elasticity of Quit Rate 5.75 Auxiliary Regression
ln z¯ Average Establishment-Wide Productivity 4.03x105 Auxiliary Regression
ψz Persistence of Establishment-Wide Productivity 0.096 Auxiliary Regression
σ2z Variance of Establishment-Wide Productivity Shock 0.325 Auxiliary Regression
cl Firing Cost 4,695 Redundancy Costs
u¯ Worker Type Productivity 1 Normalization
pi Deterministic Inflation Rate 0.013 Average Inflation
β Establishment Discount Rate 0.924 Real Interest Rate
λ1 Linear Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment 0 Choice
ψu Persistence of Worker Type Productivity 0.767 Estimation, Chapter2
σ2u Variance of Worker Type Productivity Shock 0.507 Estimation, Chapter2
φ1 Linear Hiring Cost 5.29x104 Estimation, Chapter2
φ2 Quadratic Hiring Cost 1.35x105 Estimation, Chapter2
λ0 Menu Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment 774 Estimation, Chapter2
λ2 Quadratic Cost of Downward Wage Adjustment 2.88x10−4 Estimation, Chapter2
For details on parameter calibration and estimation, please see chapter 2, section 6. The parameters for returns to scale
in production, the average quit rate, the average daily wage, the wage elasticity of the quit rate, average establishment-
wide productivity, the persistence of establishment-wide productivity, and the variance of the establishment-wide
productivity shock are estimated through a series of empirical regressions and sample averages directly from the
data, described in chapter 2, section 6. The persistence of worker type productivity, the variance of the worker type
productivity shock, the hiring cost parameters, and the nominal wage adjustment cost parameters are estimated by
indirect inference as described in chapter 2, section 6. Firing costs are set to match German redundancy costs from
the World Bank’s Doing Business project, taking the average of the cost for workers with 1 year of tenure and workers
with 5 years of tenure. The deterministic inflation rate is the average consumer price inflation rate from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators. The real interest rate is the “lending interest rate” from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators minus the calibrated inflation rate.
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Table 3.2: Counterfactual Simulated Outcomes with Alternative Inflation Rates
Annual Inflation Rate
Outcome 0.00 0.013 (Baseline) 0.05
Profit Reduction 0.041 0.033 0.017
Layoff Rate 0.012 0.011 0.007
Quit Rate 0.121 0.122 0.127
Hire Rate 0.094 0.095 0.097
Profit reduction is relative to case with baseline parameters
except for λ0, λ1, and λ2 set to zero.
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CHAPTER IV
Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes: The
Role of Establishment Size and Age
4.1 Introduction
This paper uses a novel, individual-level, administrative dataset with worker-level
wages and employer-employee matched identifiers to examine the differential rela-
tionship between establishment-level wage rigidity and the employment outcomes of
layoffs, quits, and hires by establishment size and age.
The dataset is well suited to both examine which sectors, occupations, and edu-
cation levels exhibit greater degrees of wage rigidity and to test whether there exists
a differential, establishment-level relationship between measured wage rigidity and
employment based on establishment size and age. In particular, the data contain
total compensation histories for every worker in the sample. Since the compensa-
tion histories are taken from administrative data, they should theoretically be free of
measurement error, a significant advantage of previous studies of wage rigidity that
rely on survey responses. Furthermore, in addition to providing worker wage, the
indivual data contains detailed information on the worker’s industry, occupation and
job status, and education level throughout each worker’s entire employment history.
Since individuals in the dataset are randomly sampled, the study provides es-
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timates of the degree of wage rigidity across supersectors, occupation classes, and
education levels that are representative of the whole economy. The wage rigidity
estimates show that supersectors that are more skill intensive, such as finance and
public administration, exhibit greater degrees of wage rigidity that less skill intensive
supersectors such as mining, trade, foodservice, and transportation. Similarly, the
occupation and education level wage rigidity estimates show that more skilled occu-
pations and more educated workers exhibit more measured wage rigidity than their
less skilled and less educated counterparts.
Next, the paper makes use of the establishment-level identifiers, the dataset’s
sampling of all employees in an establishment, and data on each establishment’s
birth and death years to study whether the wage rigidity and employment outcomes
relationship established in chapter 2 differs across estabishment size and age, where
establishments are categorized into large and small establishments relative to the
median establishment’s level of employment and young and old establishments, with
an establishment being labeled as young if it is no more than 5 years old and labeled
as old if it is more than 5 years old. Splitting the sample by establishment size shows
that large establishments, with an average of 25.5 percent of counterfactual wage cuts
prevented by wage rigidity, exhibit more wage rigidity than smaller estabishments,
with an average of 22.3 percent fo wage cuts prevented due to wage rigidity, and old
establishments, with 24.5 percent of wage cuts prevented, exhibit more wage rigidity
than younger establishments, with 16.1 percent of wage cuts pervented.
Finally, the empirical analysis shows that the establishment-level relationship be-
tween wage rigidity and employment outcomes is stronger for large establishments
compared to small establishments and for young establishments compared to young.
Wage rigidity increases layoffs at the average large establishment by 1 percentage
point and decreases quits and hires by 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively,
whereas wage rigidity and layoffs have no statisitcal relationship in small establish-
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ments and decreases quits and hires by 1.2 and 2.5 percentage points respectively. For
the young establishments, wage rigidity increases layoffs by 4.7 percentage points and
decreases quits and hires by 1.6 and 7.1 percentage points, respectively, on average,
wherease the average old establishment exhibits no significant increase in layoffs and
a 1.7 and 3.4 percentage point reduction in quits and hires, respectively.
This paper fits into a small but recently developing literature using large, admin-
istrative dataset to study the role of establishment and firm age play in employment
dynamics. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) use a large, administrative, establishment-
level dataset on manufacturing firms to document a significant degree of heterogeneity
of gross job creation and job destruction rates, with size and age playing a meaningful
role. They find that job reallocation rates of older, larger, and multi-unit plants, in
particular display pronounced countercyclical patterns of variation. Haltiwanger et
al. (1999) use administrative firm level data to show that older and larger firms are
more productive than their smaller and younger counterparts.
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) examine job creation in the lens of of small, large, young,
and old firms and find that, once controlling for firm age, there is no clear relationship
between firm size and growth. Fort et al. (2013) study the of firm sensitivity to the
business cycle by size and age and find that small and young firms are more sensitive
to the business cycle than larger and older firms. This paper adds to the existing
literature through the lens of downward nominal wage rigidity, documenting that
larger and older establishments exhibit greater measure wage rigidity than smaller
and younger establishments, but that there is a greater relationship between wage
rigidity and the employment outcomes of layoffs, quits, and hires in larger and younger
establishmenets than smaller and older establishments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.3 describes the data used throughout
the paper and presents the summary statistics by establishment size and age. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the estimates of wage rigidity across supersectors, occupations, and
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education levels, and presents the establishment-level distibutions of wage rigidity by
establishment size and age. Section 5.4 presents the establishment-level wage rigidity
regressions by establishment size and age for layoffs, quits, and hires. Section 5.6
concludes.
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
The paper employs administrative and survey data from the Research Data Cen-
tre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB). The main analysis uses the Linked Employer Employee
Data of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (LIAB), matched with the annual IAB
Establishment Panel Survey. The LIAB includes 5,293 West German establishments
that participated in the annual IAB establishment survey each year either from 1999
through 2001 or from 2000 through 2002, and follows each such establishment every
year of its existence from 1997 through 2003.
The LIAB also provides complete labor market biographies for each employee
liable to social security who was employed at a sampled, surveyed establishment at any
point between 1997 and 2003. The data set follows these workers entire employment,
unemployment, and wage histories from 1993 through 2007, even if the workers move
to an establishment outside the sample. The LIAB also provides the exact dates that
an employment spell begins and ends for an employee at a given establishment.
The second dataset used in the paper is the Sample of Integrated Labor Market
Biographies (SIAB). The SIAB provides complete labor market biographies for a 2
percent random sample of all employees liable to social security. However, the SIAB
does not provide worker biographies for all workers at a sampled establishment as in
the LIAB. Therefore, the paper uses the SIAB for the estiamtes of wage rigidity by
supersector, occupation, and education and the LIAB establishment-level analysis.
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics of the full sample in column 1, splitting the
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sample between large and small establishments in columns 2 and 3, and splitting the
sample between young and old establishments in columns 4 and 5. This paper follows
the convention of Fort et al. (2013) and categorizes an establishment as young if it is
no more than 5 years old and old if it is more than five years old. Fort et al. (2013) also
categorize esablishments that are less than 20 employees as small. However, this paper
only has establishments with at least 50 employess and thus simply uses the sample
median to distinguish between small and large. Therefore, it is more true to consider
the below analysis as a comparison between large- and medium-sized establishments;
however, the study uses the small/large terminology for simplicity. There are 4,608
establishment-years in the large establishments sample, 4,622 establishment-years in
the small establishments sample, 680 establishment-years in the young sample, and
8,550 establishments in the old sample.
Yearly establishment-level layoff, quit, and hire rates are measured as fractions
of the establishment’s total workforce as of December 31 of the preceding year. The
full-sample average layoff rate is 6.8 percent, the full-sample average quit rate is 11.1
percent, and the full-sample average hire rate is 21.8 percent with standard deviations
of 12.0 percent, 16.1 percent, and 33.5 percent, respectively.
Columns 2 and 3 show the layoff, quit, and hire rate averages for the large and
small establishments, respectively. It is clear from the descriptive statistics that
the small estbalishments have a higher degree of worker turnover than the lager
establishments. The average small establishment lays off 7.9 percent of its workforce,
hires 24.2 percent of its workforce, and has 12.3 percent of its workforce quit in
the average year, whereas the average large establishment lays off 5.7 percent of its
workforce, hires 19.4 perrcent of its workforce, and has 10.0 percent of its workforce
quit in the average year. However, there is very little difference in the dispersion of
layoff, quit, and hire rates between small establishments and large establishments.
Columns 4 and 5 show the layoff, quit, and hire rate averages for the young and
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old establishments, respectively. The young establisments have much larger degree
of turnover compared to the older establishments. Young establishments, on aver-
age, have more than a 3 percentage point higher annual layoff rate relative to the
old estbalishments at 9.7 percent per year. Quits are more than 5 percentage points
higher per year, on average, for young estbalishments compared to old establishments
at 15.9 percent per year, whereas hires are nearly 12.5 percentage points higher in
young establishments veruses their older counterparts at 32.3 percent per year. Sim-
ilarly, dispersion in the layoff, quit, and hire rates, as measured by the standard
deviation, is also much larger for young establishments compared to old establish-
ments. The significantly larger hire rate for young establishments compared to the
old estbalishments is indicative of the younger establishments growing faster in size
than the older, more established establishments.
Next, table 4.1 shows the average size an establishment in the full sample, the
large establishment sample, the small establisment sample, the young establishment
sample, and the old establishment sample. The mean size of an establishment in
the full sample is 549 employees. There is considerable dispersion in size among
establishments in the full sample, as the standard deviation of establishment size is
1,211 employees.
Splitting the establishments into large and small in columns 2 and 3 shows that the
mean size of an estbalishment in the large sample is 987 employees with a standard
deviation of 1,598, whereas the mean size of an establishment in the small sample is
113 employees with a standard deviation of 48. The median number of employees
in the full sample is 219, as discussed above. The median number of employees at
a large establishment is 539, whereas the median number of employees at a large
establishment is 102.
Columns 4 and 5 split the establishments into young and old and show that the
mean size of an estbalishment in the young sample is 377 employees with a standard
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deviation of 673, whereas the mean size of an establishment in the old sample is 563
employees with a standard deviation of 1,243. The median number of employees at
a young establishment is 176, whereas the median number of employees at an old
establishment is 222. The young establishents are noticeably smaller than the old
establishments. However, the descriptive statstics show that there is a signifncant
overlap in the distribution of establishment size by employees between the young and
old establishments.
The mean, nominal daily wage for an employee in the full-sample is 102.90 euros
with a standard deviation of 66.21 and a median of 90.73 euros per day. Breaking
the sample into large and small establishments, the mean, nominal daily wage for an
employee in the large establishment sample is 104.86 euros with a standard deviation
of 67.39 and a median of 92.19 euros per day, whereas the mean, nomnal daily wage
for an employee in the small establishment sample is 85.42 euros with a standard
deviation of 49.80 and a median of 77.53 euros per day. Clearly, the larger estab-
lishents pay there emplyoees more than the smaller establishments and also have a
much larger degree of dispersion in pay across its employees.
Splitting the sample into young and old establishments, the mean, nominal daily
wage for an employee in a young establishment is 102.32 euros with a standard devi-
ation of 65.26 and a median of 89.72 euros per day, whereas the mean, nomnal daily
wage for an employee in the old establishment sample is 101.78 euros with a standard
deviation of 65.66 and a median of 90.20 euros per day. The nominal wage statistics
are nearly identical aross young and old establishments.
Finally, table 4.1 shows a breakdown of revenue growth amonth establishments in
the full sample and large, small, young, and old estbalishments. In the full sample,
the average establishment has an annual revenue growth rate of 3.5 percent with a
standard deviation 20.6 percent. Large establishmnets, however, have average, annual
revenue growth of 4.1 percent with a standard deviation of 19.6 percent compared
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to average, annual revenue growth of 2.9 percent for smaller esatblishments with a
standard deviation 21.5 percent. Therefore, smaller establishments in the sample have
lower average, annual revenue growth but, at the same time, more volatile revenue
growth when compared to large establishments.
The difference in annual average revenue growth is larger between the young and
old establishments than the small and large. The average young establishment saw
its revenue grow by 6.7 percent per year, whereas the average old establishment saw
its revenue grow by 3.3 percent per year. Younger establishments also had more
dispersion in revenue growth, with a standard devaition of 23.6 percent, comapred to
the larger establishments, with a stanadard deviation of 20.4 percent.
4.3 Distribution of Wage Rigidity
To provide some context as to “where” and “how much” wage rigidity is present
in the sample, this section provides estimates of the prevalence of wage rigidity in
each supersector, broad occupation class, and education level before turning to the
establishment-level analysis. At the establishment-level, wage rigidity is dileneated
between small and large establishments and young and old to provide context as to
which types of estabishments, if any, have more rigid wages. The extent of wage
rigidity is estimated using the methodology described in section 2.4, but taking these
larger groups as the unit of analysis rather than the establishment.
4.3.1 Wage Rigidty by Supersector, Occupation, and Education
This section makes use of the 2 percent random sample of German workers pro-
vided by the SIAB to provide a representative picture of wage rigidity by supersector,
occupation, and education. For a wage change to qualify as valid by supersector,
occupation, and education categories, the employee must be classified in the same es-
tablishment and in either the same sector, occupation class, or education level for two
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consecutive years, with the employee’s hour status unchanged between those years.
Table 4.2 shows wage rigidity estimates for each supersector, occupational class,
and education level in the sample. Among supersectors, public administration ex-
hibits the highest degree of wage rigidity, with an estimated 46.6 percent of wage
cuts prevented by wage rigidity over the sample period. Finance and Administration
also display large amounts of wage rigidty, with 28.8 and 26.4 percent of wage cuts
prevented, respectively. Construction and mining/manufacturing exhibit exhibit the
least wage rigidity over the sample period, with -3.2 percent and 3.4 percent of neg-
ative wage cuts prevented due to wage rigidty. That is, the estimates suggest that
there are more wage cuts in the construction sector than one would expect from the
nominally positive portion of the wage change distribution, although this estimate is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Occupational classes are classified according to the Blossfeld grouping, a com-
mon, broad classification of occupations used in Germany. The middle portion of
Table 4.2 shows that the highest degrees of wage rigidity are concentrated among the
semi-professional, skilled commercial and administrative, and engineer occupations,
with 35.2, 34.5, and 32.9 percent of wage cuts prevented due to wage rigidity, respec-
tively, over the sample. On the other end of the spectrum, the lowest degrees of wage
rigidity are concentrated among simple manual, skilled manual, and simple service
occupations with -0.6, 2.8, and 6.7 percent of wage cuts prevented, respectively. One
oddity that emerges from the table is that the wage rigidity estimate for agricultural
occupatons is 31.2 percent, compared to an estimated 9.7 percent in the agricultural
supersector. However, the agricultural supersector contains a large fraction of work-
ers who are not employed in agricultural occupations. Many of these workers are
employed in simple and skilled manual occupations that display low degrees of wage
rigidity. Interestingly, skilled occupations consistently exhibit more wage rigidity than
their less skilled counterparts.
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Similarly, the bottom portion of table 4.2 shows that more educated groups gen-
erally exhibit higher degrees of wage rigidity. Workers whose highest educational
attaintment is a secondary school leaving certificate with no vocation are estimated
to have only 6.3 percent of counterfactual wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity.
Graduates of a University of High Science are estimated to have 41.3 percent of coun-
terfactual wage cuts prevented. Workers who receive vocational training in both the
secondary and upper secondary levels of education exhibit roughly 7 percent more
rigid wages than their non-vocational counterparts.
Consistently, though, workers who receive more education are, on average, less
likely to experiece wage cuts in the sample. One possible explanation for this observa-
tion is that more educated workers may build up higher degrees of firm/establishment
specific human capital. The theoretical model introduced and discussed in chapters
2 and 3 show that cutting wages for workers would induce quits. Losing workers with
high reserves of human capital is costly to employers in terms of training costs for
new workers. These costs would prohibit the reduction of the wages for workers with
high levels of accumulated, firm/establishment specific human capital.
4.3.2 Wage Rigidity by Establishment Size and Age
The remained of the analysis employs the LIAB to study establishment-level wage
rigidity and its relatinship to employment by establishment age and size. Table 4.3
shows the the distribution of estimated wage rigidity across establishments in the
full sample and the sample split between large and small establishments. In the
full sample mean of estimated wage rigidity across all establishments is 24.5 percent,
suggesting that approximately 24.5 percent of nominal wage cuts were prevented due
to wage rigidity at the average establishment. The standard deviation of the full
sample, establishment-level wage rigidity estimates is 23.5 percent and the median is
21.8 percent.
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Splitting the sample between large and small establishments, however, provides
noticeable differences in the estimates when compared to both each other and the
full sample estimates.The mean wage rigidity across the large establishments in the
sample is 25.5 percent, suggesting that approximately 25.5 percent of nominal wage
cuts were prevented due to wage rigidity at the average, large establishment. The
standard deviation of estimated wage rigidity among the large establishments is 24.6
percent and the median is 22.1 percent. For the sample of small establishments, the
mean of estimated wage rigidity is 22.3 percent, suggesting that approximately 22.3
percent of nominal wage cuts were prevented due to wage rigidity at the average, small
establishment. The standard deviation of wage rigidity among small establishments
is 29.0 percent and the median is 16.9 percent. Therefore, larger establishments, on
average, have noticeably higher levels of estimated wage rigidity measured by both
the mean and median when compared to smaller establishments, whereas the smaller
establishments have more dispersion in their estimates of wage rigidity compared to
larger establishments.
Differentiating establishment-level wage rigidity estimates into young and old cat-
egories provides an even more noticeable difference than the large versus small split
provided. The mean estimated level of wage rigidity for young estbalishments in a
given year is 16.1 percent of counterfactual wage cuts prevented due to wage rigidty
compared to 24.5 percent for the older establishmnets, nearly an 8.5 percentage point
difference. Similarly, the older establishments median level of estimated wage rigidity
is 8 percentage points larger than the median of the younger establishments, with an
estimated median of 20.2 percent for the old establishments compared to 10.2 percent
for the young establishments. These estimates clearly suggest that older establish-
ments have higher levels of wage rigidity relative to younger establishements.
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4.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the establishment-level wage rigidity regressions by estab-
lishment size and age. Section 4.4.1 shows the layoff regression results, section 4.4.2
shows the quits regression results, and section 4.4.3 shows the hires regression results.
4.4.1 Layoffs
Column 1 of table 4.4 shows the results for the full-sample layoffs regression,
weighted by the square root of the number of employees per establishment-year.
The coefficient on the level of estimated wage rigidity is 2.5 percent and statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The coefficients on the uninteracted
revenue growth terms are statistically insignificant, as is the coefficient on the inter-
action between wage rigidity and positive revenue growth. However, the coefficient
on the interactions between wage rigidity and negative revenue growth is negative
19.3 percent and highly significant. Economically, a one standard deviation negative
movement in revenue growth at an establishment with the sample average level of
wage rigidity is predicted to have a 1.5 percentage point increase in the layoff rate, a
34.5 percent increase in the sample average layoff rate.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.4, present the unweighted regression results from the
sample split by establishment size. The association between wage rigidity and layoffs
differs meaningfully between small and large establishments. The coefficient on the
level of wage rigidity for the large establishments in column 2 is 2.9 percent and
highly significant, while the coefficient in column 3 is -1.0 percent and statistically
insignificant. The coefficients on the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms
are not significant in either column, though the point estimate on the wage rigidity-
negative revenue growth interaction term for the large establishments is just outside
the 90 percent confidence level.
However, the coefficient on the wage-rigidity-revenue growth interaction term for
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the large establishments is economically meaningful. Figure 4.1 displays a graph illus-
trating the economic relationship between estimated wage rigidity and the predicted
increase in the layoff rate associated with a given level of estimated wage rigidity rela-
tive to the case of no wage rigidity. The solid line depicts the relationship for the large
establishments, whereas the dashed line depicts the relationship for the small estab-
lishments. Each line illustrates the predicted layoff increase-estimated wage rigidity
relationship given a one standard devation decrease in revenue growth.
The estimates suggest that negative movement in revenue growth amplifies the
positive relationship between wage rigidity and layoffs. The solid line in figure 4.1
shows that large establishments with the average level of estimated wage rigidity
of 24.5 percent of wage cuts prevented would be predicted to increase layoffs by 1
percentage point in response to a one standard deviation decrease in revenue, similarly
to the results for the full sample. The dashed line in figure 4.1 shows that small
establishments with the average level of estimated wage rigidity of 22.3 percent of
wage cuts prevented would be predicted to decrease layoffs by 0.3 percentage points
in response to such a decrease in revenue, although this prediction is not statistically
significant from zero.
Columns 4 and 5 of table 4.4, present the regression results from the sample split by
establishment age. The association between wage rigidity and layoffs differs noticeably
between young and old establishments. The coefficient on the level of wage rigidity
for the young establishments in column 2 is 5.5 percent and highly significant, while
the coefficient in column 5 for the old establishments is 0.7 percent and statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms
is significant and quite large in magnitude, with the expected, negative sign, for the
negative revenue growth term for the young estbalishments with a point estiamte of
-0.576, but insignificant for all other terms.
Figure 4.2 displays a graph illustrating the economic relationship between esti-
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mated wage rigidity and the predicted increase in the layoff rate associated with a
given level of estimated wage rigidity relative to the case of no wage rigidity by es-
tablishment age. The solid line depicts the relationship for the young establishments,
whereas the dashed line depicts the relationship for the old establishments. Each line
illustrates the predicted layoff increase-estimated wage rigidity relationship given a
one standard devation decrease in revenue growth at all points on the lines.
The estimates show that negative movement in revenue growth amplifies the pos-
itive relationship between wage rigidity and layoffs for the young establishments, as
a one standard deviation decrease in revenue growth for a young establishment with
the sample average level of wage rigidity implies a 4.7 percentage point increase in the
layoff rate relative to a young establishment with no measured wage rigidity. The 4.7
percentage point increase in the layoff rate for the average young establishment corre-
ponds to a 46.6 percent increase relative to the sample average 9.7 percent layoff rate.
The dashed line for the old estabishments in figure 4.2 is statistically insignificant
from zero.
4.4.2 Quits
Column 1 of table 4.5 shows the results for the full sample quits regression,
weighted by the square root of the number of employees per establishment-year. The
coefficient on estimated wage rigidity is negative 5.2 percent, suggesting that estab-
lishments with more wage rigidity are predicted to have fewer quits. The coefficients
on the interactions between wage rigidity and revenue growth also have the expected
signs. However, the difference between the magnitudes of the wage rigidity interac-
tions with positive and negative reveune growth are stark, with the coefficient on the
interaction between wage rigidity and positive revenue growth large and statistically
significant while the coefficient on the interaction between wage rigidity and negative
revenue growth is smaller and statistically insignificant. Economically, a one standard
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deviation movement in negative revenue growth at an establishment with the sample
average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have 1.6 percentage point decrease in the
quit rate, a 17.3 percent decrease in the sample average quit rate.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.5, present the results from the unweighted quit rate
regressions for the samples split by establishment size. The association between wage
rigidity and quits varies slightly between small and large establishments. The coeffi-
cient on the level of wage rigidity in column 2 is -5.5 percent compared to -4.4 percent
in column 3; both are statistically signficant. The coefficients on the wage rigidity-
negative revenue growth interaction terms are generally statistically signifcant and
have the same, expected, positive signs in both columns, implying that a negative
movement in revenue growth amplifies the negative relationship between wage rigidity
and quits.The magnitude of the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms are
markedly different between small and large establishments, as the interaction terms
are at least three times as large for the large establishments compared to the small
establishments.
Figure 4.3 shows the economic significance of the quit regression results by es-
tablishment size from columns 2 and 3 of table 4.5. The solid line represents the
predicted decrease in the quit rate for a given level of estimated wage rigidity for the
large establishments, and the dashed line represents the relationship for the small
establishments. Both lines assume a one standard deviation movement in revenue
growth at all points on the line.
A large establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity would be pre-
dicted to experience a quit rate 2.5 percentage points lower than a large establishment
with no wage rigidity in response to a one standard deviation decrease in revenue. The
corresponding decrease for small establishments is 1.2 percentage points. These dif-
ferences translate into 25.1 percent and 9.6 percent reductions in the sample average
quit rates for large and small establishments, respectively.
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Columns 4 and 5 of table 4.6, present the results from the quit rate regressions
for by establishment age. The relationship between wage rigidity and quits varies no-
ticeably between young and old establishments. The coefficient on the level of wage
rigidity for the young establishmentd is -9.3 percent compared to -4.8 percent for the
old; both are statistically signficant at the 99 percent confidence level. The coeffi-
cients on the wage rigidity-negative revenue growth interaction terms are, however,
statistically insignificant for both the young and old establishments.
Figure 4.4 shows the economic significance of the quit regression results by es-
tablishment age. The solid line represents the predicted decrease in the quit rate for
a given level of estimated wage rigidity and a one standard deviation movement in
revenue growth at all points on the line for the young establishments, and the dashed
line represents the same relationship for the old establishments.
A young establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity would be
predicted to experience a quit rate 1.6 percentage points lower than a young estab-
lishment with no wage rigidity in response to a one standard deviation decrease in
revenue. The corresponding decrease for old establishments is 1.7 percentage points.
These differences translate into 10.1 percent and 15.7 percent reductions in the sample
average quit rates for young and old establishments, respectively.
4.4.3 Hires
Column 1 of table 4.6 shows the results for the full sample hires regression,
weighted by the square root of the number of employees per establishment-year. The
coefficient on estimated wage rigidity is negative 5.3 percent. The coefficients on the
interactions between wage rigidity and positive revenue growth have the expected
negative sign, implying that establishments with both positive levels of estimated
wage rigidity and positive movements in revenue growth hire less than establishments
with no measured wage rigidity and positive movements in revenue growth. This
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follows from the establishments forward looking nature, as discussed in chapter 3’s
treatment of the theoretical model: establishments hiring workers in the current pe-
riod know that, in response to future negative movements in revenue, they will face
the costs of future wage cuts and future firing costs for workers hired today, reducing
the incentive to hire in the current period. Economically, an establishment with the
sample average level of wage rigidity and a one standard deviation positive movement
in revenue growth is predicted to have a 2.6 percentage point lower hire rate than an
establishment with no wage rigidity, which corresponds to a 14.8 percent decrease in
the hire rate relative to the sample average.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.6 present the results from the hire rate regressions split
by establishment size. The coefficient on the level of wage rigidity for the large es-
tablishments in column 2 is -4.8 percent compared to -3.3 percent in column 3 for the
small establishments, though only the former is statistically significant. The coeffi-
cients on the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms are statistically signifcant
for positive revenue growth, have the expected sign, and are similar in magnitude.
These coefficients have the unexpected sign for the negative revenue growth interac-
tion term but are not statistically significant, although the magnitude of the negative
revenue growth interaction term is much smaller for the small establishments in the
sample compared to the large establishments.
Figure 4.5 shows the economic significance of the hire regression results by es-
tablishment size from columns 2 and 3 of table 4.6. The solid line represents the
predicted decrease in the hire rate for a given level of estimated wage rigidity for
the large establishments and given a one standard deviation movement in positive
revenue growth, and the dashed line represents the relationship for the small estab-
lishments. A large establishment with the sample average level of wage rigidity is
predicted to have a hire rate 2.8 percentage points lower than a large establishment
with no wage rigidity in response to a one standard deviation increase in revenue. The
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corresponding decrease for small establishments is 2.5 percentage points. These dif-
ferences translate into 16.2 percent and 14.5 percent reductions in the sample average
hire rates for large and small establishments, respectively.
Columns 4 and 5 of table 4.6 present the results from the hire rate regressions by
establishment age. The coefficients on the level of wage rigidity for the young and old
stablishments are relatively similar, with point estiamtes of -9.2 percent for the young
in column 4 and -8.3 percent for the old in column 5. However, the point estiamte on
the level wage rigidity term is statistically insignificant for the young establishments.
The coefficients on the wage rigidity-revenue growth interaction terms are statistically
signifcant for positive revenue growth, have the expected sign, and are similar in
magnitude for both the young and old establishments, though the point estimate on
the positive revenue growth interation term is more than three times as large for the
young establishments compared to the old establishments.
Figure 4.5 shows the economic significance of the hire regression results by estab-
lishment age. The solid line represents the predicted decrease in the hire rate for a
given level of estimated wage rigidity and given a one standard deviation movement in
positive revenue growth for the young establishments, and the dashed line represents
the relationship for the old establishments. A young establishment with the sample
average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have a hire rate 7.1 percentage points
lower than a young establishment with no wage rigidity in response to a one standard
deviation increase in revenue. The corresponding decrease for the old establishments
is 3.4 percentage points. These differences translate into 22.0 percent and 16.3 per-
cent reductions in the sample average hire rates for young and old establishments,
respectively.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship between downward nominal wage rigidity
and employment outcomes by establishment size and age. Supersector-, occupation-,
and education-level wage rigidity estimates suggest that more highly skilled workers
are less likely to receive wage cuts, as workers in supersectors typically employing
high skilled workers, workers with more skill-intensive occupations, and workers with
higher degrees of education display higher degrees of estimated downward nominal
wage rigidity.
Establishment-level wage rigidity estimates suggest a substantial amount of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity in Germany, with an average of 24.5 percent of coun-
terfactual wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity for the full sample. Splitting the
sample by establishment size shows noticeable variation in establishment-level wage
rigidity between large and small establishments and young and old establishments.
Large establishments, with an average of 25.5 percent of counterfactual wage cuts
prevented by wage rigidity, exhibit more wage rigidity than smaller estabishments,
with an average of 22.3 percent fo wage cuts prevented due to wage rigidity, and old
establishments, 24.5 percent of wage cuts prevented, exhibit more wage rigidity than
younger establishments, with 16.1 percent of wage cuts pervented.
The empirical analysis shows that the establishment-level relationship between
wage rigidity and employment outcomes is stronger for large establishments compared
to small establishments and for young establishments compared to young. Wage
rigidity increases layoffs at the average large establishment by 1 percentage point
and decreases quits and hires by 2.5 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively, whereas
wage rigidity and layoffs have no statisitcal relationship in small establishments and
decreases quits and hires by 1.2 and 2.5 percentage points respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Layoff Regressions by Establishment Size – Economic Significance
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Figure 4.2: Layoff Regressions by Establishment Age – Economic Significance
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Figure 4.3: Quits Regressions by Establishment Size – Economic Significance
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Figure 4.4: Quits Regressions by Establishment Age – Economic Significance
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Figure 4.5: Hires Regressions by Establishment Size – Economic Significance
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Figure 4.6: Hires Regressions by Establishment Age – Economic Significance
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statisitcs by Establishment Size and Age
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CHAPTER V
Bank Balance Sheet Shocks and the Effects of the
Financial Crisis
5.1 Introduction 1
It is well known that the financial crisis had a profound effect not only on the
financial sector, but also on real firms both in the U.S. and abroad. In contrast, be-
cause of data limitations, much less is known about the effect on individual employees
employment outcomes, job changes within and across firms, wage dynamics, reloca-
tion, and other human costs as a result of the crisis and associated lending constraints
of financial institutions. Yet, understanding such individual labor outcomes are key
to understanding firm productivity in general and the welfare effects of the financial
crisis in particular.
To provide a basis to address some of these questions, this paper uses a unique
administrative data set from Germany that offers several key advantages compared
to existing sources. First, the data set includes both privately-held firms, such as
partnerships and limited liability companies, and publicly-listed firms. The dataset
not only contains individual employees wages and job titles, but also each individuals
1This chapter is joint work the Daniela Hochfellner (FDZ-IAB), Martin Schmalz (University
of Michigan, Ross School of Business), and Denis Sosyura (University of Michigan, Ross School of
Business
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complete employment history as well as geographical information of establishment
locations and workers private residence. The dataset thus allows for the tracking
of labor flows within firm, across firms and firm types, and geographic boundaries.
In contrast, most of the existing literature has focused on the firm or establishment
as the unit of observation and has been unable to follow workers from one job to
another, and, as a result, the activity within firms has remained beyond scope of
academic research.
Second, institutional features of the German financial system allow for the use of
exogenous shocks to the banking systems lending capacity that is sharply confined
to geographical regions. Specifically, local savings banks and their state-level orga-
nization, which span nearly 40 percent of the German banking market, are strictly
prohibited to conduct business outside their geographical domain in Germany. Some
of these banks, however, speculated in U.S. mortgage-backed securities during the
run-up to the financial crisis and lost billions when the market collapsed, creating
shocks to local bank capital that are unrelated to regional economic activity. Com-
bining the unique labor data with the sharp, geographically confined financial shocks
to bank capital allow for the clean identification of the effect of these shocks on
individual employment outcomes.
Third, the dataset contains financial information, both for the publicly-listed and
privately-held firms, in addition tothe worker information. As a result, the dataset
allows for the distinction between the impact of financial shocks on individual employ-
ment outcomes of privately-held versus publicly-listed firms, differentiate the effect
on firms of different legal forms (e.g., private limited liability companies versus part-
nerships) and investigate the relationship of these labor outcomes with corporate
financial policy. This is in contrast to the existing literature that has focused on
small versus large firms as proxies for access to financing and has not typically had
access to private firms financial information.
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To motivate that the bank capital shocks are geographically contained, the paper
first document the effects of the shocks on the regional economy as a whole before
turning to individual-level analyses. Using detailed, bank-level balance sheets, the
analysis shows that affected banks experienced a 20 percentage point lower bank loan
growth rate after suffering their losses relative to banks in unaffected states. Next,
the reduction in bank lending led to an output reduction by 0.3 percentage points
and a 1.4 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in each of the four
crisis years, on average, in affected states compared to states whose savings banks
were unaffected by the shock.
The analysis then turns to worker-level data and shows that the employment
effect of these shocks particularly affected the privately-held partnerships and limited
liability companies and not the publicly-listed firms. Establishments belonging to
privately-held firms in affected states reduced net hiring by 24 percentage points and
cut investment by one-half, relative to those establishments that belong to publicly-
listed firms. This result is consistent with the notion that small firms are more
bank-dependent than large publicly-listed corporations, as the privately-held firms
are, on average, smaller than the publicly-listed firms. However, the dataset includes
both small publicly-listed firms and large privately-held firms, and the results are
robust to the inclusion of size controls, suggesting that the firm’s legal form is the
key distinction for the effect of a negative shock to loan credit and not simply size.
These findings provide insights for public policy, especially with respect to how to
manage shocks to the financial sector and their effects on the real economy. First, if
firms use financial shocks to make adjustments to their labor demand and aggregate
and individual wages, as well as to the composition and hierarchical structure of the
work force in an attempt to restore greater efficiency, the best policy might be to
avoid mitigating the shock. In contrast, if the destruction of firm-specific human
capital is the main effect on firms and individuals, the appropriate policy response
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may be to contain such exogenous shocks. The results clearly indicate that in such
a case, the support should be geared towards the smaller, privately-held firms and
the retraining of individual employees in such firms, as those are most affected by a
shock to the banking system.
Second, the results reflect a tradeoff, known at least since Smith (1776), which
the regulator faces when designing a financial system. On the one hand, the region-
specific relationship banking system prevalent in the German economy may help alle-
viate problems of informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders in normal
times. Also, the geographic confinement of the banks domains mitigates spillovers
across banks of a financial shock. On the other hand, the regional economy is left
vulnerable to financial shocks that are magnified through their impact on the real
economy in such a system. The costs associated with a region-specific banking sys-
tem offers a rationale why the U.S. financial system transitioned from a regional to a
national banking system.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 describes the features of the Ger-
man financial system that are necessary to explain the empirical design. Section 5.3
describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 5.4 details the empiri-
cal strategy and discusses results: section 5.4.1 quanitifies the bank capital shock’s
impact on loan growth in the affected federal state level, section 5.4.2 esimates the
impact of the local bank credit crisis on the federal state macroeconomies, and section
5.4.3 shows the disproportionate impact of the local bank credit crisis on establish-
ments in privately-held firms comapred to their publicly-listed counterparts. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 German Banking System and Identification of Shocks
The central hypothesis of this paper is that an exogenous reduction in local credit
supply leads adverse effects on local economic outcomes, with a key transmission
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mechansim being that local credit supply shocks adversely and differentially affect
employment and investment in property, plant, and equipment at privately-held part-
nerships and limited liability companies compared to publicly-listed capital corpora-
tions, as the publicly-listed corporations can more readily access capital from both
domestic and international equity markets. Therefore, identifying an exogenous shock
unrelated to local conditions that leads to a reduction in the supply local bank credit
is crucial for testing the paper’s hypothesis. This section first discusses the institu-
tional background of the German banking system that makes Germany a convenient
setting to study the effects of an exogenous shock to bank credit and then identifies
candidate banks that were exposed to U.S. subprime mortgages during the financial
crisis, and as a result, saw significant losses in their assets.
5.2.1 German Bank Institutional Background
The German banking system is comprised of three types of banks: public banks,
cooperative banks, and private banks. The private banks include commercial banks,
investment banks, and private banking and asset management companies, among
others. They have a significant international client base. The cooperative banks are
built on a membership-share where each member has one vote, regardless of its cap-
ital share in the cooperative. The public banks consists of the local savings banks
(Sparkassen) and Landesbanks, both of which are not-for-profit entities.2 The Lan-
desbanks are a group of regional state-owned banks that serve three main functions:
first, the Landesbanks’ business is predominantly wholesale banking services, and
they are the head banking institutions (i.e. central banks and clearing houses) for the
local savings banks in each Landesbank’s particular region; second, the Landesbanks
serve as the lending houses to their federal state(s) to finance infrastructure and so-
cial housing projects; third, the Landesbanks serve as commercial banks, primarily
2Surpluses are broadly committed to social issues, including the arts, sports, cultural develop-
ment, and educational issues within the region.
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providing funding to big companies (Moody’s 2004, Hughes 2008). Each Landesbank
is owned by the federal state (Bundesland) where it is located and the collection of
local savings banks (directly or indirectly through regional associations) within its
particular region. Landesbanks are governed by regional rather than federal law.
Which savings banks own a particular Landesbank is solely determined by the region
in which the local savings bank resides, and a savings bank is prohibited by law to
own shares in any Landesbank outside of its region.
Table 5.1 shows that the private banks own nearly 54 percent of the total bank
assets from 1997 through 2011 and comprise 16 percent of all banks, whereas the
cooperative banks own 8.5 percent of total bank assets and comprise nearly 55 percent
of all banks. Table 5.1 also illustrates the significant role the public banks play in
the German banking system, making up nearly 38 percent of the total bank assets in
the German economy over the sample period from 1997 through 2011 and comprise
roughly 29 percent of all banks.
The German Savings Bank Association (Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband)
describes the structure and operatational precedures of the local savings banks to
follow five constitutive elements: a public mandate, the regional principle, munic-
ipal trusteeship, its legal status and ownership, and its decentralized group nature
(Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband 2012). First, the public mandate requires
the savings banks to practice a “sustainable business philosophy” focusing on the
“appropriate and adequate provision of credit” to all customers, including private
customers, regardless of personal income and current financial situation, and for a
“sustainable committment to the development of local businesses.” The public man-
date is issued by law and is the foundation for the savings banks’ primary mission:
to serve and promote economic and business development within the region. Fur-
ther, the public mandate allows the savings banks to extend credit to customers that
otherwise would not receive credit from other financial institutions.
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Second, the regional principle stipulates that the savings banks are authorized to
operate only within their region and “that their loan activities should focus on that
region” alone. The regional principle therefore prohibits savings banks from lending
outside of their region and searching out or accepting customers in more economically
viable regions. Further, the savings banks are required by mandate to turn down any
loan requests from customers outside of their respective regions. Thus, the regional
principle creates an environment of narrow banking by turning “local deposits into
local loans.” 3 While German savings banks are locally specialized, they are sectorally
diversified (OECD 2014).
Third, the municipal trusteeship element of the savings banks attempts to ensure
that locally anchored savings banks remain legally and financially independent. A
municipality is “the responsible pubic body of a savings bank – but not its owner”,
where a municipality may refer to a city, town, district, or an “association of local
authority for the purpose of jointly running a savings bank”. However, a savings bank
is not an asset of the municipality, the municipality owns no shares of the savings
bank, and the municipality cannot sell the savings banks for revenue generation. A
supervisory board, consisting of local council representatives and employees within
the region, ensures that the savings banks satisfy their public mandate. However,
the supervisory board has no direct impact on day-to-day operations of the savings
banks.
Fourth, the legal status and ownership are structured to prevent savings banks
from being taken over by private institutions with the primary goal to maximize
profits. The savings banks “are incorporated as institutions under public law” that
are “legally and financially independent” and have no owners. Their legal form aims
to ensure that region’s population is “adequately represented”, as the supervisory
board consists of city council officials and local citizens. However, mangement board
3See Kobayakawa and Nakamura (2000) for a survey of narrow banking.
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runs the banks’ day-to-day operations and consists of banking professionals–and not
local politicians–to ensure impartial behavior.
A fifth feature of German savings banks is their decentralized network. Since
individual savings banks are relatively small entities alone, the formation of savings
bank groups allows for the diversification of risk. Savings banks may only form
associations with other savings banks from close local regions (and within the same
federal state), and members of these associations share the same common name,
typically “Spakasse”.
It is through these regional associations that the savings banks construct their
ownership (either minority or majority ownership) in the Landesbanks. Federal law
requires the local savings bank associations to legally support and maintain liability
for the Landesbanks (Moody’s 2004). Therefore, Landesbanks may rely on the sav-
ings banks for support, and shocks to the equity of a Landesbank directly transmit
to the savings banks’ balance sheets in its region, and further, local savings banks
provide funds to the regional Landesbanks in response to a shock to the equity of the
Landesbank.
In addition, there are significant costs to firms associated with switching from
the local savings bank to a different bank. As a result, a shock to the capital of a
Landesbank that is entirely unrelated to the local economy can have consequences
for the provision of credit to local businesses, and properly identifying an exogenous
shock to a Landesbank’s capital potentially allows for the measure of the effect of an
exogenous shock to the banking system on economic outcomes. Further, identifying
an exogenous shock that affects only some of the Landesbanks rather than all would
allow for the credible exploitation of regional variation in economic outcomes due to
the contained, regional nature of the German banking system.
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5.2.2 Identification of Bank Shocks
Figure 5.1 shows a the regional distribution of the German Landesbanks and the
federal states each Landesbank covers as of 2007 and prior to the crisis. In 2007, 10
Landesbanks covered the 16 German federal states. Each Landesbank served as the
central bank in typically one federal state, with the Helba and Nord/LB Landesbanks
covering three federal states each.
The first signs of a Landesbank’s exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis occured
on August 17, 2007, when Sachsen LB, the Landesbank of the German federal state
Saxony with total assets of 68 billion euros in 2007, was forced to take an emergency
rescue loan in the amount of 17.3 billion euros from the German savings bank asso-
ciation, Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, due to its exposure to U.S. asset backed securities
(Simensen 2007). Sachsen LB’s exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis stemmed from
an off-balance sheet subsidiary, Ormund Quay, located in Dublin, Ireland. Ormund
Quay borrowed significantly in short-term commercial paper and invested in long-
term asset-backed securities, a transaction supported by a credit line from Sachsen
LB.
As the U.S. subprime crisis unfolded, investors refused to refinance Ormund Quay’s
commercial paper debt, and Sachsen LB was unable to meet its pledged line of credit,
necessitating the emergency credit bailout (Moody’s 2008). At the time, Spiegel On-
line reported that Sachsen LB’s losses due to direct involvement in subprime mort-
gages approached 500 million euros4, whereas the German newspaper Suddeutsche
Zeitung reported Sachsen LB had as much as 65 billion euros in five funds at Or-
mund Quay. State officials announced on August 26, 2007, that Sachsen LB would
be sold to Landesbank Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (LBBW), the central clearing house for
the savings banks located in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Rheinland-Palatinate, due to
4http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/debt-exposure-and-off-balance-sheet-loans-
banks-in-germany-wobble-a-500833.html
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the subprime losses. Sachsen LB no longer existed as a separate entity as of April
2008, at which point the local savings banks of Saxony transferred their holdings to
LBBW. LBBW would now serve as the central clearing house for the savings banks
in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Rheinland-Palatinate, and Saxony.5
The second Landesbank to report losses due to exposure to the U.S. subprime
crisis was HSH Nordbank, the central clearing house for the savings banks of the
federal state Schleswig-Holstein and city-state Hamburg and with total assets of 174
billion euros. Though reporting strong profits for most of 2007, on August 23, 2007,
HSH Nordbank said it had 1.8 billion euros invested in securities backed by U.S.
subprime mortgages, primarily through its subsidiaries, Poseidon and Carrera, and
HSH chief executive Hans Berger remarked, “We have a liquidity squeeze in the
market, especially for lending between banks” (Kirchfield and Schmidt 2007). Berger
stepped down in September 2008 as a result of the exposure to the U.S. crisis and
subsequent writedowns and announced a plan to retructure its business and focus
more on its core in Northern Germany going forward. HSH Nordbank had writedowns
of 1.1 billion euros and a loss of 210 million euros in 2007 (Seuss and Kirchfield 2008).
Moody’s downgraded HSH Nordbank’s long term outlook in a Novermber 2008
report, citing its increased risk profile and stretched financial profile due to direct
exposure to Lehman Brothers. Moody’s also expected HSH to rely on strong support
from the public banks going forward (Moody’s 2008). In December 2008, HSH Nord-
bank was guaranteed notes of 30 billion euros from the German federal government’s
rescue fund. On February 24, 2009, HSH Nordbank announced a deal with the federal
state Schleswig-Holstein and the city state of Hamburg to receive a capital injection
of 3 billion euros and a state backed credit guarantee of 10 billion euros.
WestLB, the Landesbank of the federal state North Rhine-Westphalia and central
clearing house for the state’s savings banks, was the next Landesbank to announce
5The politicaly aftermath of the Sachsen LB emergency bailout and sale resulted in Georg
Milbradt, the premier of Saxony, resigning from his position in April 2008.
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losses due to exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis on August 27, 2007, saying it
had nearly 1.25 billion euros of direct exposure to U.S. mortgage-backed securities
(Clark 2007). WestLB was the third largest Landesbank at the time, with total
assets of 285 billion euros in 2007. Its exposure stemmed from five subsidiaries which
borrowed money by selling short-term commercial paper and investing those funds in
securities backed by U.S. mortgages. In an attempt to limit the bank fallout from the
exposure to U.S. mortgage assets, WestLB announced on December 3, 2007, it would
guarantee full liquidity to its subsidiaries exposed to U.S. asset-backed securities,
with each having the option of drawing as much as 25 billion euros (Dougherty 2007).
However, in February 2008, WestLB received a 5 billion euro rescue package from
the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and the two local savings banks associations
(Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Girover- band and Westfalisch-LippischerSparkassen-
undGirover- band). Losses of up to 2 million euros were to be absorbed by the
owners of WestLB according to the respective ownership stakes in the bank, of which
the two savings bank associations of North Rhine-Westpahlia owned more than 50
percent (Puri et al. 2011). On April 2, 2008, West LB reported a net loss of 1.6
billion euros for 2007, directly citing exposure to U.S. mortgage-backed securities.
In addition to the 5 billion euro rescue package in February 2008, WestLB an-
nounced the creation of a bad bank called Erste Abwicklungsanstalt (EAA), and 85
billion euros in toxic assets were transfeed from WestLB to EAA in November 2009.
While referred to as a bad bank, EAA is not a bank as it does not hold a banking
license nor attempts to generate new business. EAA was established as a specialty
agency with the mission to wind up a financial portfolio of toxic assets responsibly
and sustainably.6 Therefore, EAA was viewed as serving a public function. On De-
cember 20, 2011, the European Commission approved a liquidiation plan for WestLB
submitted by the German government. After June 30, 2012, WestLB stopped taking
6For more information on EAA’s specific functions, please see https://www.aa1.de/en/about-
us/faq/general-questions/.
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new banking business (Lienemeyer and Magnus, 2011) and was disolved.7
Germany’s second largest Landesbank with assets of 353 billion euros in 2007,
BayernLB, the Landesbank of the fedral state Bavaria and the central clearing house
for Bavaria’s savings banks, was the fourth Landebank to report significant losses
due to the U.S. subprime crisis. The state of Bavaria and the savings banks as-
sociation, Sparkassenverband Bayern, each owned 50 percent of BayernLB in 2007.
BayernLB announced on February 13, 2008, it would write down 1.9 billion euros
with direct losses of 150 million euros due to U.S. subprime related investments in
2007 (Morajee 2008). BayernLB’s chief executive, Werner Schmidt, resigned less than
a week later over the losses (Morajee and Atkins 2008). By March 2008, BayernLB’s
writedowns reached 4.3 billion euros, with estimated losses at 6 billion euros. Of the
estimated 6 billion in losses, Bayern LB would be responsible for 1.2 million, whereas
the two owners of Bayern LB, the state of Bavaria and the savings bank association,
Sparkassenverband Bayern, would be responsible for 2.4 million euros each (Reuter
2008). In April 2008, a Spiegel Online report brought BayernLB under heavy criti-
cism, as it discovered the Landesbank knew about its U.S. subprime related losses in
the second half of 2007, but did not reveal those losses to the public until February
2008.8 Losses in the second half of 2007 would place the U.S. subprime crisis’s impact
on Bayern LB on a similar timeline to the impact on Sachsen LB and WestLB.
On October 21, 2008, BayernLB became the first bank to draw on support from
the German federal government’s 500 billion euro bailout fund, applying for 5.4 billion
euros of the rescue funding. BayernLB also announced it faced an additional loss of
up to 3 billion euros by the end of 2008 due to further exposure to the U.S. subprime
crisis and the recent collapse of Lehman Brothers. The additional unexpected losses
7At this point, what remained of WestLB began to operate as Portigon Financial Services AG.
EAA and the Landesbank of Hessian and Thuringian, Helba, handled the bankruptcy and carried
on with the core functions of the former WestLB.
8See http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/parteichef-am-pranger-bayernlb-krise-erschuettert-csu-
huber-in-not-a-545159.html for more details.
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prompted the resignation of the Bavaria’s finance minister, Erwin Huber, the first
politician to resign over Landesbank crisis.9 In November 2012, BayernLB began
repaying the aid received in 2008 with a payment of 350 million euros to the state
of Bavaria. To complete the agreement for receiving the 2008 aid, BayernLB must
repay the full 5.4 billion euros of rescure funding by 2019 and reduce its balance sheet
to half its 2008 level (Suess 2012).
The fifth and final Landesbank to report losses directly attributed to exposure
in the U.S. subprime crisis was Germany’s largest Landesbank, Landesbank Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg (LBBW), with total assets in 2007 of 443 billion euros and an ownership
structure of 40.5 percent by the State of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, 40.5 percent by the
savings bank associations of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate, and 19
percent by the City of Stuttgart (Moody’s 2008). LBBW serves as the central clearing
house for the savings banks of three German federal states: Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
Rheinland-Palatinate, and Saxony.10 While LBBW remained bullish on its operating
business in early 2008, due to its strong market position in the core businesses of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Rheinland Palatinate, LBBW annonced in November 2008
that it faced 800 million euros of writedowns and 1.1 billion euros of losses, citing
direct exposure to U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities (Luttmer and Simensen
2008). By the end of 2008, LBBW reported a loss of 2.1 billion euros.
In November 2008, the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, the city of Stuttgart, and the
regional savings bank assocciations of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Rheinland-Palatinate
agreed to a 5 billion euro capital injection and a 12 billio euro lifeline to support
LBBW. While a Moody’s (2008) review of LBBW viewed the capital injection and
9See http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/financial-crisis-aftermath-bavarian-finance-
minister-quits-over-bank-losses-a-585739.html for more details.
10While always serving as the central bank for the saving banks of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, LBBW
assumed complete central banking responsibilities for Saxony in April 2008, after SachsenLB failed
due to its exposure to U.S. subprime asset-backed securities, and for Rheinland-Palatinate in July
2008 when Landesbank Rheinland-Palatinate was completely integrated into LBBW and LBBW
assumed a 100 percent ownership share of Landesbank Rheinland-Palatinate.
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LBBW’s committment to reduce secondary market activities and related investments
as a long-term positive, Moody’s also expected this to be a slow process. LBBW did
not return to profit until 2012.
Table 5.2 summarizes the identified Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime
crisis, the date each bank announced its first losses, the time period when each bank
was expected to experience its first losses due to the crisis, and the resulting affected
federal states and savings banks where each Landesbank served as the central bank.
The approach reveals exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis by five Landesbanks–
SachsenLB, HSH Nordbank, WestLB, BayernLB, and LBBW–that serve as the cen-
tral bank for savings banks in seven of the sixteen German federal states–Saxony,
Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
and Rheinland-Palatinate. SachsenLB, HSH Nordbank, and WestLB all announced
first losses due to exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis within ten days of each other
in August 2007. Further, while BayernLB did not annonce its first losses until Febru-
ary 2008, there is considerable evidence that BayernLB experienced its first losses
in the third quarter of 2007, a similar time to that of SachsenLB, HSH Nordbank,
and WestLB. Thus, the narrative suggests that four Landesbanks were in crisis due
to exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis in the third quarter of 2007, affecting the
savings banks in five German states–Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, North
Rhine-Westphalia, and Bavaria. The final exposed Landesbank, LBBW, went into
crisis a year later, affecting the savings banks of Baden-Wurttemberg and Rheinland-
Palatinate. Accordingly, 2007 marks the beginning of the crisis for the remainder of
the study.
Figure 5.2 shows a map of the affected and unaffected German federal states. The
map shows significant geographical dispersion in affected states, as there are affected
states located in the north, east, south, and west. Further, each affected state borders
an unaffected state, allowing for stark regional variation. .
143
5.3 Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data11 used throughout the analysis and its descriptive
statistics. The data comprise several unique features that allow for the observation of
a large fraction of the German economy over a long period of time in a stratified linked-
employer-employee sample. Section 5.3.1 discusses the the bank-level data used to
quantify the bank shock, section 5.3.2 discusses the establishment- and worker-level
data derived from German social security records, and section 5.3.3 discusses the
regional macroeconomic variables used to quantify the state-level macro effects of the
bank capital shocks.
5.3.1 Bank Data Overview and Summary Statistics
The paper uses Bankscope data provided by the Bureua van Dijk.12Bankscope
provides the universe of annual German bank balance sheets over the sample period
from 1997 through 2011. These balance sheets include detailed information on the
banks’ annual total assets, including annual total loan value, and the banks’ annual
liabilities and equity. Bankscope also provides each bank’s registered name, street
address, postcode, and specialty (e.g. savings bank, cooperative bank, investment
bank, etc.), allowing for the identification of the savings banks that were exposed to
the U.S. subprime crisis through ownership in their respective Landesbanks and spe-
cific German federal states13 these local savings banks serve. As described in section
5.2.1, the local savings banks are required by mandate to only serve customers within
its district; thus, the geographical, bank specialty, and asset and loan information in
the Bankscope data set allows for the identification of the regional bank shocks that
arose from the subprime crisis.
11Data access was provided through the ISR-FDZ at the University of Michigan, an U.S. on-
site location of the Research Data Center of the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for
Employment Research.
12For further details, see www.bankscope.com.
13The German federal state is similar to the state in the United States.
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Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for the aggregate, federal state bank bal-
ance sheets in 2005 euros for the whole sample, 1997 through 2011, in the first column,
and for the crisis period, 2007 through 2010, in the second column. 14 Comparing the
values of total average assets and total average loans during the crisis period to that
of the entire sample shows that the level value of assets and loans were, on average,
larger during the crisis years than earlier in the sample. This observation is mostly
attributed to trend growth for both variables over the sample. Comparing the average
annual growth rates in total assets and total loans during the crisis period to that
of the entire sample shows a clear, yet small contraction both asset and loan credit
during the crisis. Average total asset growth is 3.11 percentage points lower during
the crisis period compared to the whole sample, whereas loan growth is only 1.93
percentage points lower. The average annual growth rate and standard deviation for
total loans are on par with those of total assets indicating that fluctuations in total
loans drive fluctuations in total assets over the sample and crisis period.
Table 5.4 shows the summary statistics for the aggregate, federal state bank bal-
ance sheets in 2005 euros for only the crisis period, 2007 through 2010, divided into
the federal states unaffected and affected by the Landesbank exposure to the U.S.
subprime crisis. The first column shows the summary statistics for the 9 federal
states that did not have its Landesbank exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis. To-
tal asset growth was positive and relatively large in the unaffected states during the
crisis period, averaging a growth rate of 4.72 percent with a standard deviation of
21.87 percent. Similarly, total loan growth was positive and relatively large in the
unaffected states, averaging 4.62 percent with a standard deviation of 25.75 percent.
Conversely, the 7 affected states with Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime
crisis saw a significant contraction in both asset and loan growth during the crisis
14The category of total assets for a bank consists for total loans, other earning assets such as
advances to banks, derivatives, and securities, and fixed assets, whereas total loans for a bank
consists of mortgage loans, consumer and retail loans, and corporate and commercial loans.
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period. Total asset growth averaged -10.48 percent in the affected states during the
crisis, with a standard deviation of 23.49 percent, and total loan growth averaged -
8.02 percent, with a standard deviation of 18.55 percent. Comparing to the unaffected
states, the affected states experience a 15.20 percentage point lower growth rate in
total assets and a 12.64 percentage point lower growth rate in total loans during the
crisis period.
5.3.2 Establishment- and Worker-Level Data and Summary Statistics
The paper employs administrative and survey data from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the
Institute for Employment Research. The analysis sample is constructed from various
data sources held at IAB to combine information on employers and employees. The
establishment sample is based on the IAB Establishment Panel, which is a survey that
is conducted annually by IAB since 1993 for West Germany and since 1996 for West
and East Germany. The sample includes all West German establishments that com-
pleted a survey in at least one year from 1997 through 2011 and identified themselves
as an establishment that is part of an unlisted, privately-held, partnership company
or limited liability company, or as part of a listed, publicly-traded, capital corpora-
tion. An establishment in this sample always refers to a local unit of a firm–that is,
a specific plant or building.
In addition, it is possible to merge in firm-level data for these establishments
at the FDZ. These firm data come from Bureau vam Dijk’s Orbis database and
include balance sheets of all privately-held, limited liability and publicly-listed capital
coporation firms operating in Germany from 1991 to 2014. The FDZ provides a
crosswalk from establishment to firm in order to identify which establishments operate
under one firm. Balance sheets on both privately-held and publicly-listed firms is a
considerable advantage of this study, as comparable datasets, such as Compustat,
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typically contain firm balance sheet information only for publicly-listed firms.
For each of the sampled 15,392 establishments, the sample also includes complete
worker-level histories for every worker who was employed and liable to social security
at these establishments at least one day between 1997 and 2011. The worker-level
labor market biographies provide detailed information on exact employment start and
end dates and an extensive set of employment-related characteristics such as the type
of employment, wages, professional and occupational status, and white-collar versus
blue collar jobs plus detailed individual characteristics, such as gender, birth year,
nationality, education, and vocational training. Additionally, the samples follow these
workers’ entire employment, unemployment, and wage histories from 1975 through
2010, even if the workers move to an establishment outside the sample. A detailed
description of the variables included can be obtained from Dorner et. al (2010).
The resulting individual-level employment histories are complemented with ad-
ministrative establishment data from the Establishment History Panel (BHP) (please
see Spengler 2008 for detailed information on the BHP). The BHP includes industry
classification codes and state- and district-level15 location identifiers for each estab-
lishment. Regional identification of establishments is especially important for this
paper, as the identification of those establishments exposed to the exogenous shock
to bank credit relies on the regional variation inherent in the German banking system.
In addition, the BHP contains an extension file with information on establishment
births, deaths, and re-classifications. Supplementary data in this extension allows for
the identification of establishment closures that are likely to be spin-offs or takeovers
as opposed to true closures.
The paper also make use of the survey responses from the IAB Establishment
Panel Survey. The survey is supported from the German Minister of Labor, and
therefore shows a response rate of about 80 percent among the establishments that
15Districts in Germany are comparable to counties in the United States.
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stay in the panel (Janik and Kohaut 2014). It provides information regarding an
establishment’s investment in plant, property, and equipment, including, but not lim-
ited to, the total euro value of investment spending at the establishment within the
given calendar year for every year, the fraction of investment financed through meth-
ods such as cash flow, equity, bank loans, and government subsidies, and qualitative
measures such as whether or not the establishment had difficulty acquiring bank loans
within the given calendar year. Further, the Establishment Panel Survey devotes a
special section of the 2010 survey to examine the impact the economic and financial
crisis that started in 2007 had on establishment behavior during the crisis period.
The survey questions help shed light on whether establishments in privately-held
companies qualitatively had a differential and worse experience than establishments
in publicly-traded companies as a result of the crisis, aiding the identification of the
empirical work developed throughout the remainder of this study.
Table 5.5 shows the establishment-level descriptive statistics where the unit of
analysis is the establishment-year. The employment statistics suggest there is sub-
stantial variation in establishment size across the data set and that some very large
establishments are pulling up the arithmetic average. The average establishment-year
net hire rate is -0.9 percent over the sample, where an establishment’s net hire rate
in a given year is defined as the total number of employee inflows minus the total
number of employee outflows as a fraction of total employment as of January 1 of
the given year. The median net hire rate is -0.2 percent, and the standard devia-
tion is 27.0 percent, indicating substantial variation on net employment flows across
establishment-years. The small and even slightly negative average establishment net
hire rates are consistent with the macro-level employment growth statistics. Ger-
many’s working age population steadily declined over the sample period, and the
2001 through 2004 recession and 2007 through 2010 bank crisis period cover 8 out of
the 15 years in the sample. Both contributed to muted average employment growth.
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Worker inflow and outflow rates, however, are substantially larger over the sample
period, indicating significant worker movement across establishments.
The mean value of investment per employee is 12,822 euros per establishment year
over the sample, with a median level of investment per employee of 6,651 euros and a
standard deviation of 55,053 euros. An investment per employee mean nearly twice
that of its shows that some establishments in the data set had years with investments
significantly larger than the other establishments in the dataset.
Table 5.6 shows a summary of the employment level, net hire rate, and investment
per employee statistics broken down by establishments belonging to privately-held and
publicly-listed firms. The statistics suggest clear distinctions between establishments
in privately-held and publicly-listed firms. That the median employment level is much
lower for publicly-listed with 278 employees than privately-held with 48 employees
when both are compared to their respective means suggests that a small number of
very large establishments are pulling up the mean much more for the publicly-listed
than for the privately-held, though there are a number of quite large establishments
in the privately-held firms. However, the summary statistics on employment levels
indicate a distribution for both privately-held and publicly-listed that includes a sig-
nificant amount of both small and large establishments. However, the average net
hire rates over the entire sample paint more similar picture between establishments in
privately-held firms and those in publicly-traded firms and are on par with the whole
sample average presented in table 5.5.
Investment per employee differes noticeably between the privately-held and publicly-
traded establishments. The mean and median investment per employee for the
privately-held establishments is 10,829 and 5,068 euros respectively compared to
15,741 and 9,185 euros, respecitively, for the publily-listed. Clearly, are investment
per employee is much larger for publicly-listed establishments than the pivately-held.
The standard devation of investment per employee is also significantly larger for the
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publicly-listed at 76,359 euros compared to 33,314 for the privately-held.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the establishments’ responses to survey questions directly
related to financing methods and the crisis. The survey responses suggest that the
establishments belonging to privately-held firms depend more on bank loans than
establishments in publicly-listed firms to finance their business activities and that
privately-held had a more difficult time obtaining the bank loans during the bank
credit crisis than the publicly-listed. Further, the privately-held in affected states
with banks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis reported being more strongly affected
by the crisis than publicly-listed (regardless of whether the publicly-listed establish-
ments were in affected or unaffected states) and their privately-held counterparts in
unaffected states.
5.3.3 Macroeconomic Data and Summary Statistics
Annual federal state-level macro statistics are provided by the official German
statistical agency and are used to quantify the regional macro economic impact of the
bank shock. These statistics include the 2005 consumer price index and state-level
output, household income, total employment levels, full-time and part-time employ-
ment levels, and unemployment rates. The 2005 CPI deflates all nominal, euro-valued
variables used in the paper to real variables.
Table 5.9 shows the summary statistics for key federal state-level macroeconomic
variables over the sample period, 1997 through 2011. The first column shows the
summary statistics covering the entire sample, the second column shows the summary
statistics over the 2001 through 2004 recession, and the third column shows the
summary statistics spanning the bank loan crisis period from 2007 through 2010.
The unit of observation is a given federal state in a given year, and all statistics
shown in the table are weighted by the square root of the federal state’s population
in the given year to provide a better indication of overall German macroeconomic
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performance. All euro valued variables are expressed in real values of 2005 euros, and
all growth rates are calculated as the percent change in the federal state from year
t− 1 to year t.
Average real output growth at the federal state-level over the entire 15 year sample
is low, which can largely be explained through Germany experiencing a long recession
from 2001 through 2004, with a slow recovery out of the recession after 2004, and
a second recession during with the bank loan crisis period from 2007 through 2010.
Output growth during the 2001 through 2004 recession was only 0.2 percent with a
small standard deviation of 1.0 percent across observations, indicating a relatively
uniform growth experience across federal states from 2001 through 2004. Comparing
these numbers to the bank loan crisis period from 2007 through 2010, average annual
output growth during the crisis was slightly higher at 0.4 percent. However, the stan-
dard deviation of output growth during the crisis period was 3.5 percent, noticeably
larger than the standard deviation of output during the 2001 through 2004 recession,
and indicating a much different growth experience across federal states during the
crisis.
Average real household income growth was 0.5 percent over the entire sampl, with
a standard deviation of 1.1 percent. Household income grew at a similar pace during
the 2001-2004 recession with an average growth rate of 0.6 percent and a standard
devition of 1.0 percent. Somewhat remarkably, though, average real household income
grew at a strong pace during the bank loan crisis period when compared to both the
entire sample and the 2001 through 2004 recession, with an average growth rate of 1.6
percent. The standard deviation during the crisis period was also larger, measuring
at 1.6 percent, again indicating a more varied experience across federal state over
the crisis period than over other periods during the sample. That household income
experienced relatively strong average growth during the bank crisis period helps to
support that the contraction in loan growth over the period is not demand driven.
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Total employment growth over the entire sample period was 0.7 percent with a
standard deviation of 1.6 percent, a low growth rate which is explained by both a
steady decline in the overall and working populations in Germany and the extended
downturns through the time period. During the 2001 through 2004 recession, average
total employment growth was -0.7 percent with a standard deviation of 1.2 percent.
Remarkably, though, average total employment grew steady pace over the loan crisis
period from 2007 through 2010 at an average rate of 1.1 percent and a standard
deviation of 1.1 percent.
Breaking employment growth into both full-time employment growth and part-
time employment growth helps to explain some of the dynamics occurring in the total
employment growth numbers. Full-time employment at the federal state-level con-
tracted, on average, from 1997 through 2011, whereas part-time employment grew at
a strong rate. During the 2001 through 2004 recession, full-time employment fell indi-
cating a relatively uniform contraction in growth rates across federal states, whereas
part-time employment grew. The loan crisis period from 2007 through 2010 saw
a modest average growth rate in full-time employment albeit with strong variation
in the growth rates across federal states, as some federal states saw full-time em-
ployment grow and some federal states saw full-time employment contract. However,
most federal states experienced strong part-time employment growth during the crisis
period.
The stark differences between full-time and part-time employment growth can be
explained through a series of labor market policies instituted in Germany over the
sample period. In 1999, Germany introduced the first of the Hartz Reforms of the
labor market that was instituted in four waves through 2005. A second German labor
market policy that helps explain the strong growth in part-time employment during
the bank loan-crisis period is the institution of short-time work.16 While short-time
16Short-time work is a program in which workers accept a reduction in work hours in exchange
for government subsidies through employers to augment their salary to make up for wages lost due
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work as a labor market policy has been available in Germany since the 1970s, it was
only sparingly used until the the crisis, when Germany experience a large spike in the
number of workers on short-time, peaking at nearly 1.5 million workers at the height
of the crisis. The increase in short-time work has largely been viewed as a success
in avoiding mass layoffs, reducing the rise in the unemployment rate by roughly half
of what it would have been without the policy during the crisis (Brenke et al. 2011)
and saving nearly 500,000 jobs (Balleer et al. 2013).
The unemployment rate over the entire sample averaged 9.4 percent, with a stan-
dard deviation of 4.5 percent. The large standard deviation in the unemployment
rate stems from the noticeably larger unemployment rates in the East German fed-
eral states compared to the West German federal states. The average unemployment
rate rose to 10.6 percent with a standard deviation of 5.1 percent during the 2001
through 2004 recession. However, the unemployment rate fell to 7.7 percent during
the loan crisis period when compared to the whole sample and the 2001 through
2004 recession, with a markedly lower measured standard deviation of 3.1 percent.
These trends during the crisis can again be attributed to active German labor market
policies meant to combat mass layoffs and high unemployment rates during the crisis.
5.4 Regression Results
This section provides the empirical results quantifying the effect of the bank capital
shock on regional bank loan credit, the impact of the bank loan credit contraction on
regional macroeconomic outcomes, and the differential effect of the bank loand credit
shock on establishments in privately-held firms compared to establishments belonging
to publicly-listed firms.
to the hour reduction.
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5.4.1 Bank Loan Credit During the Crisis
Section 5.2.2 documents that five Landesbanks, owned by the savings banks in
seven federal states, were exposed to and experienced significant losses directly at-
tributed to the U.S. subprime crisis starting in 2007. This leads to a key question of
the analysis: did bank loan credit from savings banks siginicantly fall in the seven
federal states with Landesbanks that experinced losses due to direct exposure to U.S.
subprime asset-backed securities?
While the differences in average growth rates between the affected and unaffected
states presented in table 5.4 are quite stark, isolating the effect and statisitcal sig-
nificance of the crisis on the bank activity in the affected states requires a more
formal analysis. The nature of the banking shock allows for the exploitation of both
time-series and cross-sectional variation to isolate its impact on bank asset and loan
growth, exploiting time variation through the pre-crisis and crisis periods and ex-
ploiting cross-sectional variation through the affected and unaffected states through
each state’s Landesbank exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis. Thus, to quantify the
impact of the shock on asset and loan growth in the affected states during the crisis,
the analysis relies on a the following difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) specification:
BankActivityit = β0 + β1Crisist + β2AffectedStatei
+β3(Crisist × AffectedStatei) +W ′Υ + it (5.1)
where BankActivityit is either total asset growth or total loan growth in federal state
i from period t− 1 to t, Crisist takes a value of 1 during the crisis period from 2007
through 2010 and 0 otherwise, AffectedStatei takes the value of 1 if the federal state
is one of the seven states to have its Landesbank exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis
and zero otherwise, (Crisist×AffectedStatei) takes a value of 1 for an affected state
during the crisis period and zero otherwise, and W is a vector of control variables
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including a dummy variable for whether a federal state is in East Germany and a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the 2001-2004 recession and 0 otherwise.
Validity of the diff-in-diff approach relies on satisfying the parallel trend assump-
tion. The parallel trend assumption applied to the bank activity framework in equa-
tion (5.1) requires that total assets and total loans for both the unaffected and affected
states follow the same trend in absence of the affected states’ Landebanks exposure
to the U.S. subprime crisis. Figure 5.3 shows the time series of total real loans (in
2005 euros) aggregated for all 9 of the unaffected states and the time series of total
real loans aggregated for all 7 of the affected states, both indexed to 100 in 2004.
The figure appears to tell a very clear story: the trends for total loans in both the
unaffected and affected states are nearly identical until 2007, when there is a clear
break. Beginning in 2007 (the start of the crisis period), the total loans time series
for the affected states begins a clear downward trajectory while the total loans for
the unaffected states continues to grow. Therefore, the behavior of the total loans
time serieses for the unaffected and affected states strongly suggests that the parallel
trend assumption applies.
Table 5.10 shows the results for the estimated equation (5.1), with column 1
showing the results where the federal state total bank asset growth rate is the de-
pendent variable, and column 2 showing the results where the federal state total
loan growth rate is the dependent variable. The key estimated coefficient of in-
terest for both the asset and loan growth regressions is βˆ3–the coefficient on the
(Crisist × AffectedStatei) interaction variable–which isolates the impact that ex-
posure to the U.S. subprime crisis had on the bank asset and loan growth rates in
the affected states under the diff-in-diff. The estimated coefficient on the interaction
term in the asset growth rate regression takes a value of -.245 with a standard error
of .077, and the estimated coefficient on the interaction term in the loan growth rate
regression takes a value of -.202 with a standard error of .076. Both coefficients are
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statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence-level.
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the interaction term for both
regressions is as follows: Total bank asset growth was 24.5 percentage points lower
in the 7 federal states with Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis during
the crisis period, and total loan growth was 20.2 percentage points lower in affected
states compared to the unaffected states during the crisis.17 Both estimates, however,
indicate a severe and marked contraction in bank activity in the affected states during
the crisis.
While the regression results in table 5.10 provide clear evidence of a severe con-
traction in bank activity in the affected states during the crisis, the question still
remains as to whether the contraction is due to a reduction in the supply of available
bank credit in the affected states or the reduction in the demand for bank credit.
The narrative in section 5.2.2 suggests the exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis led
to a marked reduction in the affected states’ bank balance sheets, and thus a marked
reduction in the supply of credit. A formal analysis to disentangle the supply and
demand effects, however, requires analyzing whether the number of loan applications
fell in the affected states during the crisis or whether the loan acceptance rate de-
creased in the affected states during the crisis. Unfortunately, data on the number of
loan applications and the acceptance rate of loan applications is not publicly avail-
able nor is it available in the restricted access datasets made available for this study.
Puri et al. (2011) use individual bank loan application data from the Bundesbank
spanning the time period from the third quarter of 2006 through the second quar-
17The difference between the estimated coefficients on the interaction term in the asset growth
and loan growth regressions compared to the simple summary statistics from Table 5.4 comparing
asset and loan growth in the affected and non affected states can be explained by the estimated
coefficient, βˆ2, on the affected state dummy. These estimated coefficients indicate that affected
states have, on average, a 9.3 percentage point higher gorwth rate in assets and a 8.0 percentage
point higher growth rate in loans over the sample period. Adding βˆ2 and βˆ3 in both the asset growth
and loan growth regressions yields a difference of 15.2 and 12.2 percentage points, for each respective
regression, when comparing the affected states versus the not affected states. These numbers are
nearly identical to the differences calculated from the means in table 5.4.
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ter of 2008 to study exactly whether the number of loan applications to the public
savings banks decreased in the affected states during the crisis or whether the loan
rejection rate increased. They find clear evidence that loan acceptance rates at the
public savings bank fell by nearly 12.5 percentage points (from a loan acceptance rate
of 97.34 percent in the third quarter of 2006 to 84.93 percent in the second quarter
of 2008) in the affected states compared to no decrease in the unaffected states and
that any contraction in the available credit can be attributed to a reduction in the
supply of bank loans.
5.4.2 The Macroeconomic Impact of the Bank Loan Credit Shock
Section 5.4.1 provides stark evidence that bank loan credit fell drastically in the
federal states with Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis, with loan growth
rates contacting by 20 percentage points compared to loans in federal states without
exposed Landesbanks. However, the question remains as to whether the bank credit
crunch in the affected federal states had any impact on these states’ real economy.
The following diffrence-in-difference empirical specification again exploits the time-
series and cross-sectional variation in the bank shock to quantitatively examine the
impact that a reduction in bank loan credit due to Landesbank exposure to the U.S.
subprime crisis has on the macroeconomic variables at the federal state-level:
MacroV ariableit = δ0 + δ1Crisist + δ2AffectedStatei
+δ3(Crisist × AffectedStatei) +X ′Ψ + ηit (5.2)
whereMacroV ariableit is a vector including output growth, total employment growth,
full-time employment growth, part-time employment growth, and the unemployment
rate in federal state i and period t; Crisist takes a value of 1 during the bank loan
crisis period of 2007 to 2010; AffectedStatei takes a value of 1 if one of the 5 Lan-
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desbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis serves as the central bank to the savings
banks of that federal state; (Crisist × AffectedStatei) takes a value of 1 for an af-
fected state during the crisis and 0 otherwise; and X is a vector of control variables
including a dummy variable for whether a federal state is in East Germany; a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 for the 2001 through 2004 recession and 0 otherwise;
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the years 2005 and after to account for
the implementation of the most significant stage of the Hartz reform; and the growth
rate of the number of short-time workers in the economy to control for active German
labor market policies.
The key coefficient of interest in the estimation of equation (5.2) is δ3, the coeffi-
cient on the (Crisist ×AffectedStatei) interaction term. The estimated coefficient,
δˆ3, quantifies the differential effect of the bank balance sheet shock on the macroe-
conomic variables in the affected states with exposed Landesbanks during the crisis
relative to the unaffected states in which its Landesbanks were not exposed during
the crisis. Therefore, the point estimate of δˆ3 should isolate the impact of the negative
shock to bank credit on the macroeconomic variable of choice and will be the focus
of the analysis below.
Table 5.11, column 1 shows the results of the estimated equation (5.2) with real
output growth serving as the dependent variable. The key estimated coefficient of
interest, δˆ3, on the (Crisist ×AffectedStatei) is -.003, implying that affected states
with Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis had a 0.3 percentage point
lower output growth rate than unaffected states, on average, during the four year
crisis period. However, the point estimate on the interaction coefficient is statisti-
cally insignificant at 90 percent confidence level. However, the point estimate on the
Crisist variable is -0.011 and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level implying that all states experienced an average decline in output growth of 1.1
percentage points, on average, over the four crisis years. This fall in output growth
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corresponds to approximately 2.5 times the sample average output growth rate.
Columns 2 through 4 of table 5.11 show the results of the estimated equation (5.2)
with total employment growth rate, full-time employment growth rate, and part-time
employment growth rate as the respective dependent variables. The point estimate of
δˆ3 isolating the impact of the bank balance sheet shock in the affected states during
the crisis is negative in all three equations, implying that an exogenous contraction
in loan growth due to exposure to the U.S. subprime crisis results in a contraction
in employment growth. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the
95 percent confidence level for both the total employment growth and the full-time
employment growth regressions, whereas the estimated coefficient is statistically in-
significant for the part-time employment growth regression. Economically, though,
the point estimates imply that the bank loan credit shock in an affected state during
the crisis resulted in a 0.9 percentage point reduction in total employment growth, a
0.8 percentage point reduction in full-time employment growth, and a 0.9 percentage
point reduction in part-time employment growth relative to unaffected states during
the crisis. These employment growth reductions are equivalent to 128.5, 225.0, and
28.1 percent reductions in total employment growth, full-time employment growth,
and part-time employment growth relative to each respective sample average.
Table 5.11, column 5 shows the estimated results of the unemployment rate re-
gression. The point estimate on the (Crisist×AffectedStatei) variable isolating the
isolating the differential effect of the bank credit shock on the unemployment rate in
affected states relative to unaffected states is large in magnitude at 0.14 and statisti-
cally significant at the 90 percent confidence level. A positive point estimate on the
interaction term suggests that the bank loan contraction during the crisis increased
the unemployment rate in the affected states compared to the unaffected states by
1.4 percentage points, on average, during the four crisis years. A 1.4 percentage
point increase in the unemployment rate corresponds to a 14.9 percent increase in
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the unemployment rate relative to the 9.4 percent sample average.
Overall, the macroeconomic regressions present clear evidence that the bank credit
contraction resulting from the exposure of the 5 Landesbanks covering 7 federal states
had an effect on the respective federal states’ real economy. Employment growth
(total employment, full-time, and part-time) all fell noticeably in the affected states
relative to the unaffected states during the crisis, whereas the unemployment rate in
the affected states rose significantly. Further, output growth contracted significantly
in all states during the crisis period.
5.4.3 The Impact of the Bank Credit Shock: Privately-Held versus
Publicly-Listed Companies
Section 5.4.1 showed that federal states with a Landesbank exposed to the U.S.
subprime crisis saw a signifcant 20.2 percentage contraction in loan growth compared
to federal states without an exposed Landesbank, and section 5.4.2 mapped the bank
credit contraction into adverse real economic outcomes in output and employment for
the affected federal states. This section explores a mechanism through which exoge-
nous shocks to bank credit work their way through the economy: Shocks to bank credit
differentially affect privately-held partnerships and limited liability firms compared to
publicly-listed firms. A publicly-listed company has access to a wide array of methods
to finance its business activity, including access to both domestic and international
equity markets, cash from an international base of customers, and private bank credit
from local banks, and more typically, commercial banks with an international reach.
Privately-held companies, however, rely much more heavily on access to local bank
credit and do not have access to the same equity markets and international commer-
cial banks as publicly-listed companies. Therefore, when a bank shock that leads to
a contraction in the supply of local credit hits the economy, publicly-listed compa-
nies can turn to equity makerts and international lenders to finance their business
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activities, whereas privately-held companies will be forced to reduce their business
activities, thereby negtively impacting real economic outcomes. This section investi-
gates the privately-held versus publicly-traded companies mechanism using matched
employer-employee data linked with the annual establishment-level survey data from
German Federal Employment Agency.
The survey results from section 5.3.2 lend credence to the central hypothesis of the
paper that establishments belonging to privately-held firms are more dependent on
bank loans to finance business activities than establishments belonging to publicly-
listed firms and that an exogenous shock to bank capital, reducing the supply of loans,
will differentially and adversely affect the net hiring and investment at establishments
in privately-held firms relative to those in publicly-listed firms. This sections turns
to the comprehensive, administrative, employer-employee matched dataset to directly
test the hypothesis.
The following diff-in-diff empirical specification exploits both the cross-sectional
and time-series variation of the bank capital shock identified in section 5.2.2 to esti-
mate the differential effect bank exposure to the U.S. subprime has on establishment-
level net hiring rates and levels of investment per employee for establishments in
privately-held firms in affected states during the crisis:
EstabDecisionit = α0 + α1Crisist + α2AffectedStatei + α3Privateit
+α4(Crisist × AffectedStatei)
+α5(AffectedStatei × Privateit)
+α6(Crisist × Privateit)
+α7(Crisist × AffectedStatei × Privateit)
+Y ′Ω + ξit (5.3)
where EstabDecisionit is a vector including the net hiring rate and investment per
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employee, in 2005 euros, in establishment i and period t, Crisist takes a value of 1
during the bank loan crisis period of 2007 from 2010 and 0 otherwise, AffectedStatei
takes a value of 1 if 1 of the 5 Landesbanks exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis serves
as the central bank to the savings banks of that federal state and 0 otherwise, Privateit
takes a value of 1 if the esablishment belongs to a privately-held firm and 0 if the
establishment belongs to a publicly-listed firm, (Crisist × AffectedStatei) takes a
value of the 1 for the affected states during the crisis in 0 otherwise, (AffectedStatei×
Privateit) takes a value of 1 for privately-held establishments in affected states and 0
otherwise, (Crisist × Privateit) takes a value of 1 for a privately-held establishment
during the crisis and 0 otherwise, (Crisist × AffectedStatei × Privateit) takes a
value of 1 during the crisis for establishments belonging to privately-held firms in
the affected states and 0 otherwise, and Y is a vector of control variables including
a dummy variable for 1999, the year of the first wave of Hartz Reforms, a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 starting in 2005 to account for the period after all
Hartz reforms were implemented, a dummy variable for establishments that have
a work council, a dummy for establishments that have collectively bargained wage
agreements, a dummy variable for the 2001 through 2004 recession, controls for the
establishment’s occupational mix, the fraction of female employees, and the average
age of the establishment’s workforce.
The key coeffcient of interest in the estiamtion of equation (5.3) is α7, the coeffi-
cient on the (Crisist×AffectedStatei×Privateit) interaction term. The estimated
coefficient, αˆ7, quantifies the differential affect on net hiring rate and investment
per employee on privately-held establishments compared to the publicly-listed in the
affected states with exposed Landesbanks during the crisis.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show the results from the net hire rate and investment per
employee regressions, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 differ based on the inclusion
of the establishment-level employment measure dummies that indicate whether an
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establishment has instituted a policy of short-time work, reduced the offering of over-
time hours, on average, for its employees, or reduced normal working hours for its
employees within the given year. Column 1 does not include dummies for these
establishment-level employment measures, whereas column 2 includes the employ-
ment measure dummies. However, the results are quantitatively similar regardless
of whether the employment measures are included for both the net hire rate and in-
vestment per employee regressions. Therefore, the remaining analysis focuses on the
results presented in column 2 of both tables.
For the net hire rate regression, the key estimated coefficient, αˆ7, on the triple
interaction term, (Crisist × AffectedStatei × Privateit), is -0.239 and statisitically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level, suggesting that establishments belong-
ing to privately-held firms in affected state had a 23.9 percentage point lower hire
rate during the crisis relative to establishments belonging to publicly-listed firms in
affected states during the crisis. For comparison, the regression shows that net hire
rates fell by roughly 3 percentage points during the 2001 through 2004 recession, a
difference of nearly 8 times.
For the investment per employee regression, the estimated coefficient, αˆ7, on the
triple interaction term, (Crisist × AffectedStatei × Privateit), is -6,021 and statis-
tically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, suggesting that establishments
belonging to privately-held firms in affected state had a differential reduction in in-
vestment per employee of 6,021 euros during the crisis relative to establishments
belonging to publicly-listed firms in affected states during the crisis. Table 5.6 shows
that the average level of investment per employee at establishments in privately-held
firms is 10,829 euros over the sample, meaning that a 6,021 reduction in investment
per employee corresponds to a 56 percent reduction relative to its sample average.
Overall, the establishment-level empirical results show a clear, differential, and
adverse effect on net hiring at establishments belonging to privately-held firms com-
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pared to establishments belonging to publicly-listed firms in affeced states during
the crisis. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that an exogenous shock
to bank credit will affect more bank-dependent, privately-held firms compared to
publicly-listed establishments that have access to equity markets that they can turn
to during a bank loan credit crisis.
5.5 Related Literature
A large literature has argued that loan supply shocks affect real economic activity.
Initial identification concerns were alleviated one study at a time (Ben S. Bernanke
and Cara S. Lown, 1991; Diana Hancock and James A. Wilcox, 1992, 1997; Anil K
Kashyap et al., 1993; Kashyap and Jeremy C. Stein, 1994a, b; Peek and Rosengren,
1995a, 1995b,1997, 2000, Calomiris 2003). All these studies are conducted at the level
of the macroeconomy, economic region, or the firm.
The recent financial crisis has led to renewed interest in how bank shocks are
transmitted through the financial system and what the real consequences are in terms
of investment, employment, and economic activity. De Haas and Van Horen (2012)
document that shocks from the U.S. financial crisis were transmitted internationally
through inter-bank lending relationships. Aiyar (2012) documents the effect of such
drying up of banks’ international funding sources on the UK economy. Similarly, but
in a domestic context, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that U.S. banks that
had better access to deposit financing cut their lending less in response to the drying
up of commercial paper markets in the U.S., indicating that the dry-up of banks’
funding markets was a major determinant of their reduction in lending. In contrast,
Puri et al. 2011 show the effect of a shock to bank capital (as opposed to a shock
to the banks’ funding liquidity) on lending behavior in Germany, using the same
institutional setting as this paper. Whatever the mechanism leading to reduced bank
lending, if firms were able to costlessly switch to healthier banks, such shocks would
164
be of no consequence to real economic activity.
Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows that especially smaller firms suffer more from re-
duced bank lending and shed more labor as a result. The observation that small firms
are especially vulnerable to loan supply shocks is reflected also in studies by Khwaja
and Mian (2008) and Greenstone and Mas (2012).
There are two main distinctions of this study from the above ones. First, the
unit of observation is the individual employee in this paper, whereas the finest level
of granularity in existing work is the establishment. Second, this paper makes a
substantial step in terms of identification. The identification in this study relies on
multiple, geographically confined banking shocks, rather than a single shock implied
by the 2007 financial crisis and the Lehman bankruptcy which may also have affected
firms’ and banks’ expectations about future economic prospects. Also, the shocks
employed here are entirely imported from a different economic system and thus more
clearly exogenous than studies of the effects of U.S. financial system shocks on U.S.
labor outcomes. These imported shocks are solely due to faulty corporate governance
mechanisms in the Landesbanks and have nothing to do with local economic activity.
Also, the funding of the savings banks is almost entirely local, which isolates the
shock to capital from a dry-up of funding markets. Moreover, the shock used here
applies only to sharply delineated geographies.18
More subtle distinctions from previous work on the real effect of banking shocks
are that the dataset in this paper allows for the study of differential effects of banking
shocks not only on small versus large firms but also but also for privately-held ver-
18The granularity of the banking shocks in the data and the resulting identification benefits is
also a key distinction from the study by Duygan-Bump et al. (2010) and Jimenez (2014). While
the identification in this study bases statements on bank supply reductions on bank balance sheet
data, this paper checks the consistency of the identification with real firms’ survey evidence on
financial constraints. In contrast to Campello et al. (2010), the dataset used in ths paper allows for
the distinction between affected and unaffected states within a country and between privately-held
and publicly-listed firms. This granularity allows for a more clean differentiation of local bank loan
supply shocks due to capital constraints from reductions in credit supply due to worries about future
economic prospects of the economy.
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sus publicly-listed firms while controlling for size. Consistent with previous results,
small firms are more affected by bank shocks. This study adds, however, that a key
mechanism is not necessarily size, but the legal form of the firm and the varying
methods of financing business activities associated with those legal forms. Relatedly,
the results speak to a literature on labor relations across different types of firms. On
the one hand, Bach (2010), Bassanini et al 2012, Ellul and Pagano (2013), and Sraer
and Thesmar (2007) show that family firms provide more employment and wage in-
surance than firms without family control19. The results of this paper indicate that
the provision of wage and employment insurance is particularly vulnerable to funding
shocks in private firms.20
The results are consistent with the existence of a “financial accelerator” Bernanke
et al. (1996) in the sense that bank capital is an important state variable for the
aggregate economy. The present paper also relates to Becker (2104) in the isolation
of the effect of bank loan supply shocks to corporate policies.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper uses a comprehensive employer-employee dataset from German so-
cial security records to examine the impact of exogenous shocks to bank capital on
firms’ employment and investment. A narrative approach identifies 5 German re-
19See also Mueller and Phillipon (2006).
20Similar to Chava and Purnanandam (2011) and Ago (2012), the results indicate that firms
that rely more on banks are more affected by larger shocks to their bank’s capital than firms with
access to other forms of financing. The key distinction is that the primary outcome variables of this
study are labor outcome variables rather than firm value or investment, which the previous studies
could not address due to data constraints. Also, the geographical heterogeneity across affected and
unaffected states allows for even stronger causal claims about the correlations documented here.
Compared to Cornett et al. (2011), the effect of banking shocks in Germany is propagated through
the banking system because of the commitment of banks within a state to replenish each others’
and the associated Landesbanks’ capital, whereas the previous study focuses on banks in isolation.
Second, this study link the banking shocks to real outcomes. Another subtle distinction is similar
to Ashcroft (2005). This study makes clear that bank failures are not necessary to induce large
economic contractions as a result of shocks to bank capital. None of the banks in the sample failed,
yet the liquidity support from related banks led to a reduction in lending on their behalf.
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gional Landesbanks covering 7 federal states with significant trading losses from U.S.
mortgage-backed securities. The local savings banks in the affected states directly ab-
sorbed their respective Landesbanks’ trading losses onto their balance sheets, causing
a deep economic contraction in the banks’ exclusive geographic domain. Loan growth
and output growth decline by an average of 20 and 0.3 percentage points, respec-
tively, and the unemployment rate rises by 1.4 percentage points in affected states,
compared to unaffected states in each of the four crisis years. The effect is stronger
for establishments belonging to privately-held, bank-dependent firms than for estab-
lishments in publicly-listed firms. Private firms in affected states reduce net hiring by
24 percentage points and cut investment by more one-half, relative to publicly listed
firms.
Future extensions of this work will focus on identifying the individual-level costs
placed on workers due to the shock to local bank capital. The rich, individual-level,
administrative data allows for quantifying the impact of the crisis on affected workers’
wages, displacement, and unemployment duration. Further, detailed job, industry,
education, and geographical identifiers will allow for the study of whether affected
workers moved to unaffected states to find new work, received further education or
took part in job re-training programs in order to facilitate an occupational switch, or
if the publicly-listed firms benefited from the adverse effect of the bank loan crisis on
the privately-held firms through obtaining the privately-held’s human capital.
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